TABLE OF CASES

This section identifies major specific plan-related litigation. The following brief summaries highlight the pertinent principles, but are by no means comprehensive discussions of each case. Our intent is simply to bring these cases to your attention. Readers should refer to the full text of the cases for in-depth information. For advice regarding the applicability of a case to specific situations, particularly those cases involving "takings," consult your legal counsel.

YOST V. THOMAS (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561

The Park Plaza Corporation filed several applications, including a specific plan, to authorize construction of a 360-room hotel and conference center under the City of Santa Barbara’s certified Local Coastal Program (LCP). After the council had approved the project, a local citizens’ group attempted to file a referendum petition to reverse the council’s action. The petition was rejected by city clerk Thomas. The City argued that its approval was ministerial under the Coastal Act and not subject to referendum. The citizens group sued and the trial court found for the City, holding that City’s actions were administrative under the Act and that the powers of initiative and referendum apply only to legislative actions by a local governing body.

The Supreme Court reversed. The Court cited the established principle that referendum applies only to legislative acts. Since adopting or amending a general plan and rezoning are legislative acts, the Court reasoned that specific plans are likewise legislative. The Court also concluded that in enacting the Coastal Act the Legislature had not intended to eliminate local legislative authority. While the Coastal Commission may disapprove an LCP which is inconsistent with state policy or too weak to effectively implement it, the Commission may not specify the precise content of the LCP. Furthermore, local governments may choose the means of implementing the Coastal Act and may be more restrictive of particular development than state policies require.

CHANDIS SECURITIES CO. V. CITY OF DANA POINT (1997) 52 Cal.App. 4th 475

The council approved Chandis’ general plan amendment and specific plan for a hotel and 370-unit residential development on the Headlands. Petitions were filed forcing a voter referendum on the project and, as a result of voters’ denial, the council’s action was reversed.

The court held that although the city council acted reasonably to approve the project, the electorate is empowered to reverse that action, particularly since reversal did not conflict with the general plan and maintained the status quo. The court held that the restriction on denying a "development project" under Government Code Section 65589.5 does not apply to legislative projects.

STANISLAUS NATURAL HERITAGE PROJECT, SIERRA CLUB V. COUNTY OF STANISLAUS (1996) 48 Cal.App. 4th 182

In 1993 the County of Stanislaus certified an EIR for a proposed specific plan for a 29,500-acre resort community including 5,000 residences. Suit was brought contending, among other things, that the EIR was inadequate due to its failure to adequately discuss the environmental effects of supplying water to the project. The analysis of water covered the supply through the first 5 years of the project, but deferred further analysis of the supply of water to future phases of development. The county and other respondents contended that "there is no analysis of the potential impacts of the eventual long-term supply" relying upon the tiering provisions of CEQA. Tiering allows for a more specific EIR incorporating by reference the discussion in prior environmental documents allowing for concentration on the environmental effects not analyzed as significant effects in the prior report.

The trial court denied the petition ruling in favor of the county and other respondents. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision because the approval of the project did not follow the fundamental purpose of CEQA being to inform the public and decision makers of the environmental consequences of a project. An EIR must address the impact of supplying water in that the County must "attempt in good faith to fulfill its obligation under CEQA to provide sufficient meaningful information regarding the types of activity and environmental effects that are reasonably foreseeable (Laurel Heights I supra, 47 Cal.ed at p. 399.)."

MITCHELL V. COUNTY OF ORANGE (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 1185

During a public hearing on the North Tustin Specific Plan, a property owner requested that their land be re-designated for professional office uses. The Board of Supervisors adopted the North Tustin Plan, but in doing so designated the contested property for residential rather than office uses. The Board also found the plan to be compatible with the general plan. The owner petitioned for a writ of mandate claiming, among other things, that the specific plan was inconsistent with the general plan.

The trial court denied the petition and the owner appealed contending that the court should have used the substantial evidence test when reviewing a specific plan’s conformance with a general plan.

The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, referencing Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561, 571, noting that the adoption of a specific plan is a legislative act. Therefore, "Judicial review of ‘[a]ctions taken by an administrative agency in its legislative capacity ... is limited to an examination of the proceedings before the agency to determine whether its action has been arbitrary or capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether it has failed to follow the procedure and give the notices required by law.’ [citations]"

This "arbitrary and capricious" test also applies to challenges to a specific plan’s conformance to a general plan. Consequently, the court determined that the consistency determination rests with Orange County’s board of supervisors and would not be set aside unless the board acted arbitrarily, capriciously or without an evidentiary basis.

This case indicates that the "arbitrary and capricious" test, rather than the "substantial evidence" test, is the appropriate standard of judicial review for a specific plan adoption. The courts apply the "arbitrary and capricious" test to determine whether there is a rational basis for a legislative act. The burden of proving unreasonableness falls on the person who challenges the local legislature’s action. The burden is heavy since, in general, the courts presume that legislative actions are valid. The courts apply the substantial evidence test to adjudicative acts to determine whether they are supported by findings based on substantial evidence. Consequently, from a city’s or county’s viewpoint, the latter test is more rigorous.

ANDERSON V. CITY OF LA MESA (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 657

The city of La Mesa’s standard zoning ordinances required single-family dwellings to be set back at least five feet from the side lot lines while an applicable specific plan ordinance required ten foot setbacks. A property owner applied to the city for a building permit to construct a new house. The proposed placement was to be about seven feet from a side property line—in compliance with zoning, but not the specific plan. The city issued the permit and the home was built. The city inspected the house six times during construction; however, upon completion, the city refused to issue the occupancy permit unless the owner removed that portion of the house within the ten foot setback required by the specific plan. Further, the city declined to grant a variance allowing a side yard setback encroachment. The owner filed a petition for writ of mandate.

The superior court determined that the owner had acquired a vested right to the existing building location because she had relied in good faith on the building permit. In addition, the court found no grounds for denial of the variance, but that remodeling would cost $6,000. The court also found that the city had abused its discretion and ordered the variance and occupancy permit to be issued. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment.

This case illustrates one of the problems that may arise if a city or county fails to keep its zoning ordinance consistent with its specific plan.

PEOPLE V. COUNTY OF KERN (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 830

In May of 1972, Kern County approved tentative subdivision maps to create 356 lots on 275 acres in Cuddy Valley near Los Padres National Forest. The map approvals required the developer to obtain the county’s approval of a specific plan and zone change. The county’s adoption of the specific plan "...expressly provided that ‘amendments to the zoning ordinance applicable to the area shall conform to this specific plan’ in accordance with the tentative maps on file." The developer submitted a zone change application and prepared a draft EIR. The zone change involved reclassifying the site from light agricultural to estate zones. The county circulated the draft EIR to interested public agencies and private groups. The county received numerous comments pertaining to the draft EIR, some of which raised serious environmental issues. The county approved the final EIR without responding to comments on the draft. The county also approved the rezoning and thereafter issued a grading permit.

In November of 1973, the California Attorney General filed an action against Kern County and the developer to prevent the issuance of building permits and other entitlements for construction and to require the preparation of an adequate EIR. The trial court denied a preliminary injunction and the Attorney General appealed seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to issue the preliminary injunction. Kern County contended that the developer had acquired a vested right to develop by virtue of the approval of the tentative maps and adoption of the specific plan. It also claimed that the zone change was a ministerial act and not subject to CEQA.

The Court of Appeal issued the writ of mandamus. It directed the trial court to issue the injunction enjoining Kern County from granting the developer’s building permits and entitlements. Based on state law and county zoning ordinance, the court determined that Kern County retained discretion to approve or deny zone changes. Consequently, the approval of the tentative map and specific plan were not the only approvals subject to discretionary action. The approvals did not commit the county to amend the zoning ordinance and as a discretionary project, the rezoning was subject to CEQA in which the final EIR was inadequate due to the lack of response to comments in the Final EIR.

This case indicates that a local government’s approval of a specific plan neither provides a vested right to develop nor an automatic zone change entitlement. A government retains its discretion in deciding rezoning application submitted to carry our specific plans.