Landi v. County of Monterey (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 934
An application was filed to rezone property to allow for the construction of condominiums. After preparing an environmental impact report, the planning commission and the board of supervisors subsequently denied the rezoning. The property owner filed suit contending that the application was approved by an operation of law due to the failure of the county to act within the one year time limit prescribed by the Permit Streamlining Act. The trial court held for the county and the decision was appealed.
The Permit Streamlining Act requires that a development project be approved or denied within one year from the date the application is accepted as complete. The appellate court's decision is based upon whether a rezoning is a "development project" subject to adjudicatory approval and the Permit Streamlining Act. The court found that a rezoning is a legislative act ("generally speaking, a legislative action is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts" (Patterson v. Central Coast Regional Commission (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 833)). In this case, a rezoning is the change of a rule which is to be applied to all future cases, namely, the allowable uses of the property. Thus, the one year limitation of the Permit Streamlining Act is not applicable to rezonings.
Orsi v. City Council (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1576
An application to amend a planned unit development permit was filed. The permit was assigned an application number and distributed to reviewing agencies and departments. The application was rejected and notifice given to the applicant 11 days after the end of the 30 day time limit established under the Permit Streamlining Act for acceptance or rejection of an application. The applicant proceeded to submit a revised application for which a negative declaration was approved by the city council. Staff prepared a planned unit development permit which was recommended for denial by the planning commission. The city council heard the project, required that an EIR be prepared and later denied the permit. Subsequently, the applicant filed a petition for writ of ordinary mandamus, administrative mandamus, and declaratory relief based upon several contentions, the majority of which were rejected by the trial court. The decision was appealed with the court finding the following:
The first application was accepted as complete as an operation of law due to the failure of the city to notify the applicant of its completeness within 30 days of submittal. The first application is the basis for the remaining time limits because the second application would have been necessary only if the city had made a timely notification of rejection. The time limits set forth by the Permit Streamlining Act place a mandatory duty on the agency to accept or reject the application within the specified time limits.
Secondly, under the law at that time, development projects had to be either approved or denied within six months of being accepted as complete if a negative declaration was adopted. In this case, the city argued that no negative declaration was adopted because the council did not have the actual permit for consideration at the time of the hearing where action was taken on the negative declaration. The appellate court found that CEQA requires the lead agency to consider the proposed negative declaration and any comments received prior to approving the project. There is no requirement that the consideration of a project and its negative declaration occur concurrently.
Finally, the court found that there was no waiver of the time limits
by mutual consent. Therefore, because the city did not approve or disapprove
the application within the statutory time period, the project was approved
by an operation of law.
Newberry Springs Water Association v. County of San Bernardino (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 740
The county adopted a negative declaration and approved a permit for a dairy. Opponents of the project filed suit contending that they had not received adequate notice of the preparation of the negative declaration pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act and that an EIR should be prepared. The trial court and the appellate court ruled that the opponents had been given adequate notice of the preparation of the negative declaration and that substantial evidence supported the county's determination.
The State Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court decision. The mailing
of referral memos and notices of hearings prior to the adoption of the negative
declaration demonstrated that the county made a good faith effort to provide
notice pursuant to CEQA. The court cited the Legislature's intent that the
statutory requirements for public notice are satisfied when the agency makes
a good faith effort to follow the procedures prescribed by law, as a general
rule. The opponents attendance and testimony at the hearings also demonstrated
adequate notice.
Cohan v. City of Thousand Oaks (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 547
A large residential development was conditionally approved by the planning commission. At a separate city council meeting where the item was not on the agenda, public objections to the commission's action were heard; however, no formal appeal was filed. Following the objections, the council voted to appeal its planning commission's decision to itself. It also voted to waive the 72 hour public notice requirement of the Brown Act and to hear the appeal as an urgency matter. After discussing the matter, it voted to conduct a subsequent hearing at which the project was denied.
The applicants filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for violation of civil rights. The trial court found for the city in that although it had not complied with applicable codes and statutory law in its first decision, the final deciding hearing was proper. The court reasoned that although procedurally improper for the council to appeal the decision to itself, someone would have appealed the decision anyway.
The court of appeal reversed and ordered a nullification of the council's
appeal to itself. The cumulative errors of the city violated the applicants
substantive and procedural due process rights. The city improperly appealed
the commission's decision to itself and the reasoning that it would have
been appealed anyway is speculative and not supported by the record. It
improperly applied the Brown Act's urgency measure failing to provide proper
public notice and an agenda 72 hours prior to the public hearing and failed
to file written findings in resolutions within the time periods permitted.
Bickel v. City of Piedmont, Nov. 20, 1997, 16 Cal.4th 1040
The Bickels submitted drawings to the Planning Commission for approval of a proposed second-story addition to their home. The Commission, at a hearing, concluded that a partial second story was the best option for their property. The applicants requested that the matter be continued for six months, and submitted revised drawings. At a subsequent hearing, the Commission, with the applicant's approval, continued the matter for an additional three months. Another set of revised drawings were submitted and subsequently denied by the Commission. The decision was appealed to the City Council, asserting that the remodeling application was "deemed approved" because the Commission failed to act on the matter within the time limits set out in the Permit Streamlining Act.
The city council upheld the planning commission's decision. A trial court denied the applicant's petition for a writ of mandate holding that the time limits of the Act are subject to waivers and that the applicants had waived the time limits. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the time limits are primarily for the benefit of applicants seeking agency approval and serving that purpose would bar waivers.
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that there is nothing
in the language of the Act prohibiting an applicant from voluntarily waiving
the statutory time limits. By indicating to the Commission that they wanted
an extension, the applicants voluntarily waived their rights under the Act.
Findleton v. El Dorado County (1993)12 Cal.App.4th 709
The applicant filed an application for a Certificate of Compliance in January of 1991. The application was conditionally approved in September of 1991. The applicant filed a petition for alternative writ of mandamus to force the county to issue a non-conditional certificate of compliance contending that the county failed to act within the 6 month time limit of the Permit Streamlining Act. The trial court denied the petition and an appeal followed.
The appellate court ruled specifically on the applicability of the time
limits of the Act to Certificates of Compliance. The court ruled held the
PSA is only applicable to "development projects." A certificate
of compliance is a "ministerial project" requiring no exercise
of discretion in the course of its approval. Therefore, the county's failure
to act within the time limits of the Act did not entitle the applicant to
issuance of a non-conditional certificate of compliance.
Ciani v. San Diego Trust & Savings Bank (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1604
Applicants filed for a demolition permit to remove several historic structures located within the coastal zone. An EIR was prepared and certified. However, the city failed to act on the application within a timely manner resulting in the applicant providing public notice and filing a petition for writ of mandate for the demolition permit and required coastal permit to be deemed approved. The permits were issued and resulting petitions for a temporary restraining order and injunctions were filed by opponents to the project and the Coastal Commission. The petitioners contended, amongst other things, that proper permit procedure was not followed and that the permits could not be issued until a 10-day coastal permit appeal period lapsed.
The appellate court held that although the permit was deemed approved by a local agency as an operation of law under the Permit Streamlining Act, the permit could be appealed to a state agency under the Coastal Act. The court found that: (1) the public notice was insufficient because it was not provided to the Coastal Commission, therefore issuance of a "deemed approved" permit was precluded; and (2) there are no provisions of the Permit Streamlining Act which would preclude appeals of coastal permits under the Coastal Act.
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