INDUSTRIAL USES

Screening For Junkyards - Scrap Metal Processing Facilities


Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, junkyards, scrap metal processing facilities, and automobile dismantling facilities may be established, operated or maintained within areas adjacent to any highway included in the national system of interstate and defense highways or the federal-aid primary highway system which are within 1,000 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way if they are zoned industrial or if the junkyard, scrap metal processing facility, or automobile dismantling facility is located in unzoned industrial areas as determined by the department; provided, that the department is authorized to screen junkyards, scrap metal processing facilities, and automobile dismantling facilities located within such industrial zones or unzoned industrial areas so as not to be visible from the main traveled way of such highways if the director finds that such screening is necessary or desirable for the purposes set forth in subdivision (a) of Section 745. The director's determination as to what constitutes an unzoned industrial area shall be subject to approval by the Secretary of Commerce of the United States.
STREETS & HIGHWAYS CODE SECTION 749

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INITIATIVES

Initiatives that forestall annexations until citizens approve an amendment to a general plan's land use element by majority vote

In L.I.F.E. Committee v. City of Lodi (89 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11386, California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, Sept. 6, 1989), the court of appeal overturned a local initiative that kept annexations from being approved until local voters approve an amendment to the general plan's land use element. The court found that the initiative measure conflicts and unlawfully interferes with the state's annexation process. The court cited Ferrini v. City of San Luis Obispo ((1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 239) as the basis for its decision. The latter held that annexation is a matter of statewide concern, and that the Legislature intended to occupy the field with regard to annexation.

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MINING

Mining on Federally Owned Land


States are permitted to impose environmental controls on mining activities on federally owned land, according to a 1987 U.S. Supreme Court ruling. In this case, the high court held that the California Coastal Commission could require a company to obtain a permit for its limestone mining operations in the Big Sur region of the federally owned Los Padres National Forest. The decision represented a victory for states, particularly western states with substantial acreage owned by the federal government. It allows states to impose environmental regulations upon private mining operations conducted on federal lands. The decision may have a far broader reach, for the Court has distinguished "land-use decisions" from "environmental regulation," noting that states may impose "environmental regulations" even where they have no authority to make "land-use decisions" (California Coastal Commission, et al. v. Granite Rock Company, (1987) 107 S.Ct. 1419; Curtin, p. 66)

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NATIVE AMERICAN/INDIAN LAND

Building and Zoning Ordinances in General


Federal policy and legislation have preempted state and local governments from regulating Indian land, and thus, a county may not enforce its zoning ordinance or building code except unless by Congress. (Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, (9th Cir. 1975) 532 F.2d 655, 658)

Outdoor Advertising on Indian Reservation Land Adjacent to Interstate Highways

Despite the preceding preemption, outdoor advertising on Indian reservation property that lies adjacent to an interstate highway is subject to regulation by the California Outdoor Advertising Act. In a 1984 California Court of Appeal case, the court found that the federal Highway Beautification Act (23 U.S.C. Sections 131 et seq.) contains limits on acceptable advertising devices located adjacent to interstate highways, but it also leaves implementation of these limits to individual states. California's implementation is realized by the California Outdoor Advertising Act. The court ruled that the Outdoor Advertising Act does apply to Indian reservation lands adjacent to interstate highways, after applying the 'balancing of interests' legal standard. (People v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Company (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 516)

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NOISE

A recent federal appeals court reversed a previous decision remanded from the Supreme Court. The newest decision held that federal regulations do not totally preempt state regulation where the federal Environmental Protection Agency has failed to regulate (1) noise at a railroad property line and (2) noise from certain equipment. Specifically, the court held that the Delaware noise control statute is not preempted by federal Noise Control Act on its face or as applied to the railroad facility. (Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. v. Oberly (Jan. 8, 1988) 837 F.2d 108, U.S. Court of Appeals, 3rd Cir.)

Until the Baltimore and Ohio decision, state governments had been guided by the Federal Noise Control Act of 1972, which prevented any state or political subdivision from adopting or enforcing any noise regulation which is not identical to EPA regulations. The only exception is that states and local governments could control environmental noise through licenses, regulations, and restrictions on the use, operation, or movement of any product or combination of products. (42 U.S.C. 4905(e))

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OIL, GAS, HYDROCARBONS AND MINERAL EXTRACTION

Oil Company Leases of Government Land


Oil companies with leases from the Federal Government are not required to obtain permits as required by the local zoning ordinance. (Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp. (1979) 601 F.2d 1080, 9th Cir.)

Oil, Gas, other Hydrocarbons or Mineral Extraction Leases

The following statute applies:
(a) The board of supervisors, boards of trustees, directors or other governing body of any county or other public or quasi-public corporation, body or agency authorized to acquire and hold real property pursuant to the statutory authority under which such county, corporation, body or agency is created may, under such limitations and restriction as are prescribed by law, lease for the production of oil, gas and other hydrocarbons or for the mining of any other minerals whatsoever, any land owned by the county or such other public or quasi-public corporation, body or agency, or include such land in a community lease embracing adjoining lands, or enter into compensatory royalty agreement in lieu of making such lease, whenever, in the judgment of the governing body, the public use of such property shall not be substantially interfered with thereby. No land used, owned, dedicated, or acquired by purchase, condemnation, gift, or otherwise, as a public park, highway, street, walk, or public use of such property shall not be substantially interfered with thereby; provided, however, that if in the judgment of the governing body of any such park, highway, street, walk or public playground, drilling for oil or gas would not substantially interfere with the use of such property for park, highway, street, walk or playground purposes, then any such lease on any such property shall provide that drilling for oil or gas beneath the surface of such property shall be done by means of slant drilling from surface locations, outside the outer boundaries of any such property, or from designated locations inside the outer boundaries of such property, which inside locations have been approved by the county parks commission and will not interfere substantially with the use of such property for such park, highway, street, walk or playground purposes. No land owned or under the jurisdiction of the county or such other public or quasi-public corporation, body or agency lying within 300 feet above the line of high tide, or at any point below the line of high tide, of the Pacific Ocean, or any arm, bay, or inlet of the Pacific Ocean shall be leased for the drilling for and production of petroleum products or other minerals, unless the use of such property for public purposes shall be leased for the drilling for and production of petroleum products or other minerals, unless the use of such property for public purposes shall not be substantially interfered with thereby; provided, however, that if in the judgment of the governing body of any such land, drilling for oil or gas would not substantially interfere with the use of such property for public purposes, then any such lease on any such property shall provide that drilling for oil or gas beneath the surface of such property shall be done by means of slant drilling from surface locations, outside the outer boundaries of any such property, or form designated location inside the outer boundaries of such property, which inside locations have been approved by the governing body and will not interfere substantially with the use of such property for public purposes.

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no tide or submerged lands owned or under the jurisdiction of the county or such other public or quasi-public corporation, body or agency shall be leased for the exploration for, drilling for or production of petroleum products within the boundaries of the areas of the County of Los Angeles described in subdivision (a) of Section 6871.2 unless such lands are within one nautical mile of the ordinary high water mark, the applicable conditions of the Public Resources Code and requirements of the State Lands Commission have been met, and the drilling for oil and gas deposits is to be done by means of slant drilling from an upland site.
PUBLIC RESOURCES CODE SECTION 7051

Oil Well Regulation

Many state statutes regulate oil and gas production (Public Resources Code Section 3000-3787). However, oil well regulation does not preempt reasonable local zoning regulation. (Beverly Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles, (1953) 40 Cal.2d 552; Longtin, p. 317)

Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales

Federal Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) lease sales are not subject to a consistency determination as provided by the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA). (Secretary of the Interior v. California, (Jan. 11, 1984) 52 U.S.L.W. 4063, U.S. Supreme Court)

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OUTDOOR ADVERTISING (SIGNS AND BILLBOARDS)

The federal Highway Beautification Act and the California Outdoor Advertising Act (Business and Professions Code Sections 5200-5486), administered by CalTrans, seek to control and regulate outdoor advertising along federal interstate, federally aided, and state highways. Both acts occupy the entire field of outdoor advertising, thus preempting cities and counties to the extent the act controls (Business and Professions Code Section 5227). However, the act is intended to provide minimum standards only and, with exceptions, local agencies may impose restrictions on advertising displays equal to or greater than those imposed by the act.

Local agencies may not require owners of certain advertising displays, including those lawfully erected and still in existence on November 6, 1978 to remove them. (Business and Professions Code Section 5412.5). In order for cities and counties to force such removal, they must compensate the owner pursuant to specific amortization schedules. (Business and Professions Code Sections 5412, 5412.1, & 5412.2; Longtin, pp. 283-284)

Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no advertising display which was lawfully erected anywhere within this state shall be compelled to be removed, nor shall its customary maintenance or use be limited, whether or not the removal or limitation is pursuant to or because of this chapter or any other law, ordinance, or regulation of nay governmental entity, without payment of compensation, as defined in the Eminent Domain Law (Title 7 (commencing with Section 1230.010) of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure), except as provided in Sections 5412.1, 5412.2, and 5412.3. The compensation shall be paid to the owner or owners of the advertising display and the owner or owners of the land upon which the display is located.

This section applies to all displays which were lawfully erected in compliance with state laws and local ordinances in effect when the displays were erected if the displays were in existence on November 6, 1978, or lawfully erected after November 6, 1978, regardless of whether the displays have become nonconforming or have been provided an amortization period. This section does not apply to on-premise displays as specified in Section 5272 or to displays which are relocated by mutual agreement between the display owner and the local entity.

Relocation, as used in this section, includes removal of a display and construction of a new display to substitute for the display removed.

It is a policy of this state to encourage local entities and display owners to enter into relocation agreements which allow local entities to continue development in a planned manner without expenditure of public funds while allowing the continued maintenance of private investment and medium of public communication. Cities, counties, cities and counties, and all other local entities are specifically empowered to enter into relocation agreements on whatever terms are agreeable to the display owner and the city, county, city and county, or other local entity, and to adopt ordinances or resolutions providing for relocation of displays.
BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 5412

A city or county may not deny, refuse to issue, or condition the issuance of a business license or a permit to construct a new legal on premises advertising display upon the removal, conformance, repair, modification, or abatement of any other on-premises advertising display on the same real property where the business is to be or has been maintained if both of the following apply:
(a) The other display is located within the same commercial complex which is zoned for commercial occupancy or use, but at a different business location from that for which the permit or license is sought.
(b) The other display is not owned or controlled by the permit applicant, and the permit applicant is not the agent of the person who owns or controls the other display.
BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 5498.1

(a) During the amortization period for a nonconforming legally in place on-premises advertising display's continued use, a city or county may not deny, refuse to issue, or condition the issuance of a permit for modification or alteration to the display upon change of ownership of any existing business if the modification or alteration does not include a structural change in the display.
(b) Subdivision (a) of this section does not apply to any ordinance introduced or adopted prior to March 12, 1983, or adopted pursuant to subdivision (j) of Section 5497, if the ordinance contains no specific amortization schedule, but instead requires conformity upon change of ownership.
BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 5498.2

"For Sale" Signs

Civil Code Section 713 provides that a property owner may display a sign advertising property for sale, lease or exchange "notwithstanding any provision of any ordinance."

Off-site Advertising Signs

The trial court enjoined an advertising company from maintaining offsite advertising signs and structures which were in violation of a city's comprehensive land use zoning ordinance, and ordered them removed. The ordinance permitted offsite signs only in general commercial zoning districts, and, with a permit, in unclassified zones. It declared all offsite signs and billboards in other zones nonconforming uses and public nuisances, and required their removal within five years. The court found that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the city's police power; that the signs were public nuisances as a matter of law; that the ordinance's five-year amortization period was a reasonable exercise of the police power; and that the corporation was therefore not entitled to compensation for damages sustained in removing the signs. The United States Supreme Court subsequently held that the ordinance was facially unconstitutional insofar as it constituted a general ban on noncommercial advertising on outdoor signs, and the city adopted new ordinances to comply with the law set forth in the court's opinion.

The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment as to a sign which came within the purview of the California Outdoor Advertising Act (Business and Professions Code Section 5200 et seq.), holding that the corporation was entitled to compensation for its removal; affirmed the judgment enjoining the corporation from maintaining its nonconforming signs and order their removal; and held that the city's comprehensive zoning ordinance, as amended by the new ordinances, was partially preempted by the Outdoor Advertising Act and was to that extent invalid. The court also held that the required removal of the corporation's signs was not a "taking" without just compensation in violation of the U.S. Constitution, 5th Amendment (subject to the provisions of the act relating to removal of signs near federal highways). (City of Salinas v. Ryan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 416)

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PETS IN PUBLIC RENTAL HOUSING FOR THE ELDERLY

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no public agency which owns and operates rental housing accommodations, shall prohibit the keeping of not more than two pets by the elderly in such rental housing accomodations.
For the purposes of this section:
(a) "Person requiring supportive services" means a person as defined in Section 50685.5
(b) "Elderly" means any person over the age of 60.
(c) "Pet" means a domesticated dog, cat, bird, or aquarium.
(d) "Public" means state, county city, city and county, district, or other political subdivision of the state.

Nothing in this section shall prevent the local housing authority from requiring the removal from any housing of any pet whose conduct or condition is duly determined to constitute a threat or nuisance to the other occupants of the housing. No pet may be kept in violation of humane or health laws. Nothing in this section authorizes a local housing authority to impose any requirement which makes the keeping of a pet by an elderly person or person requiring supportive services financially prohibitive.

The local housing authority shall not be liable for personal or property damages caused by any pet in the rental housing accomodation, except upon proof or prior actual knowledge on of its agents or employees of a dangerous propensity of the pet or hazardous condition created by the pet.

Nothing in this section shall prevent the local housing authority from adopting reasonable regulations relating to any such pets; prevent the adoption of differing terms for the tenancy which are reasonably related to the presence of such pet; or relieve a tenant from any liability otherwise imposed by law for damages caused by such pet when proof of same exists.

The adoption of any regulations pursuant to this section, or the application of any regulation adopted pursuant to this section, may be appealed by an elderly resident or elderly applicant in accordance with the grievance procedure of the local housing authority established to resolve tenant disputes. A copy of the grievance procedures shall be provided to a elderly tenant or elderly applicant who keeps a pet.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE SECTION 19901

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POLLUTION

Abatement of Pollution as a Public Nuisance


The State of Illinois sued the City of Milwaukee in the U.S. Supreme Court to abate the pollution of Lake Michigan for which the City of Milwaukee and other Wisconsin cities allegedly were responsible. The Supreme Court ruled that the federal common law of nuisance would govern, but declined original jurisdiction and remanded the case to federal district court. Illinois then sued in U.S. District Court, claiming that the pollution was a public nuisance under federal law, a public nuisance under Illinois common law, and a violation of Illinois statutory environmental law. (Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, (1972) 406 U.S. 91; Hite, 60 Tulane Law Review 407-411)

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PSYCHIATRIC CARE FACILITIES

In a 1982 case a city zoning ordinance contained overlapping definitions of hospitals, convalescent homes, and rest homes. Further, it allowed rest homes and convalescent homes in R-2 zones with conditional use permits. However, under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 5120, mental health facilities are allowed in the same zone, R-2 in this case, that would allow rest homes and convalescent homes. (City of Torrance v. Transitional Living Centers for Los Angeles, Inc. (1982) 30 Cal.3d 516)

It is the policy of this state as declared and established in this act and in the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act that the care and treatment of mental patients be provided in the local community. In order to achieve uniform statewide implementation of the policies of this act, it is necessary to establish the statewide policy that, notwithstanding any other provision of law, no city or county shall discriminate in the enactment, enforcement, or administration of any zoning laws, ordinances, or rules and regulations between the use of property for the treatment of general hospital or nursing home patients and the use of property for the psychiatric care and treatment of patients, both inpatient and outpatient.

Health facilities for inpatient and outpatient psychiatric care and treatment shall be permitted in any area zoned for hospitals or nursing homes, or in which hospitals and nursing homes are permitted by conditional use permit.
WELFARE & INSTITUTIONS CODE SECTION 5120

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PUBLIC CAPITAL FACILITIES

Cemeteries


Local zoning authorities may not justify the exclusion or restriction of cemeteries on purely aesthetic grounds or where the circumstances indicate that establishment and operation of the cemetery will not adversely affect the public health or safety. (Abbey Land & Improvement Co. v. County of San Mateo (1914) 167 Cal.434; Longtin, p. 312)

Jails

California case law has not addressed the issue of state preemption of jails. In Kentucky, however, a county is immune from local zoning regulations in establishing a jail. The county is an instrumentality of the state and is thus immune from complying with zoning regulations. The court stated that cities and counties have the dual purpose of performing purely local functions and of serving as arms of the state government in the administration of various state functions. The court reasoned that the county is complying with the legislative mandate that it provide for the incarceration of prisoners and that it does not matter that the county participated in a joint city-county planning commission and the adoption of a comprehensive plan for the county, the city, and several other cities. (Edelen v. County of Nelson (Kentucky Ct. App. Feb. 6 1987) 728 S.W.2d 887; Land Use Law, November, 1987, pp. 14-15)

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PUBLIC HEARING, MEETING BROADCASTING & TELECASTING

Radio and television stations shall be permitted to broadcast and telecast, either directly or by means of transcriptions and film, the proceedings of all meetings and hearings, other than adjudicative proceedings conducted pursuant to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 11500) of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code, of all state, county, and municipal administrative agencies that are required by law to be open to the public, provided that cameras and other equipment used at the meeting or hearing must operate silently and not require auxiliary lighting.

Any such agency may waive the provisions requiring silent operation of the cameras and other equipment or excluding auxilary lighting for such cameras and other equipment.

The chairman or presiding officer of the agency may require pooling of equipment when he deems it necessary to limit the number of pieces of equipment for the orderly conduct of the meeting.

Meetings of, or hearings by, administrative agencies to consider the appointment, employment or dismissal of public officer or employee or to hear appeals by or complaints or charges brought against such officer or employee shall not be subject to the provisions of this chapter.
GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 6091

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PUBLIC UTILITIES

. . . Zoning ordinances of a county or city shall not apply to the location or construction of facilities for the production, generation, storage, or transmission of water, or for the production or generation of electrical energy, nor to facilities which are subject to Section 12808.5 of the Public Utilities Code, nor to electrical substations in an electrical transmission system which receives electricity at less than 100,000 volts. Zoning ordinances of a city or county shall apply to the location or construction of facilities for the storage or transmission of electrical energy by a local agency; provided, that such zoning ordinances make provision for such facilities.
GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 53091, IN PART

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Prepared by:
State of California
Governor's Office of Planning and Research
1400 Tenth Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
916-445-0613