Other Guidelines for Making Findings
Despite the uncertainty in statutory findings requirements for legislative
actions and in land use controls by initiative and referendum, Topanga
still provides the clearest direction for making findings. Other guidelines
have emerged from case law in Topanga's wake to help local officials
make sound, legally sufficient findings.
1. A final decision making body may use a subordinate body's findings,
but it is not obligated to do so.
Final decision making bodies such as city councils are free to reject the
findings of their planning commissions or boards of zoning adjustment, if
they deem appropriate (Foundation for San Francisco's Architectural Heritage
v. City and County of San Francisco (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 893, 906),
especially in light of new evidence submitted on appeal. (Lagrutta v.
City Council of Stockton (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 890, 895.)
Administrative appeals also involve issues of the adequacy of findings.
The extent to which a subordinate body's findings govern the appellate body's
decision will be determined by local procedures. If local regulations require
a hearing de novo, the body conducting the hearing is not bound by the subordinate
body's findings. In other jurisdictions, the appeal hearing may be limited
to only those aspects of the decision actually appealed. In these cases,
prior findings not raised on appeal are left undisturbed.
First corollary: Local procedures governing appeals
may affect the proper adoption of findings.
Whitman v. Board of Supervisors of Ventura County (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d
397, 416, illustrates how local procedures governing appeals affect the
adoption of findings. In Whitman, the Planning Commission and staff
recommended that the Board certify an environmental impact report (EIR)
and approve a conditional use permit with 59 conditions. The applicant appealed
seven of the 59 conditions, but the Commission and staff recommended that
the Board deny the appeal. The recommendation included findings to support
the denials. In keeping with a local ordinance, the Board's approval of
the conditional use permit automatically meant approval of the findings
that the lower body, in this case the Planning Commission, made. The Board
granted the appeal, thereby eliminating the seven conditions and retaining
the rest. Acknowledging that the local ordinance resulted in the Board's
automatic adoption of the lower body's findings, the Court held that when
the Board certified the EIR and approved the conditional use permit, it
also adopted the pertinent record and findings concerning the EIR and conditional
use permit. Thus, the record lacked findings necessary to support granting
the appeal, and the court remanded the decision for the Board to adopt the
necessary findings.
Second corollary: When a decisionmaker declines to follow
a staff recommendation that includes proposed findings, the decisionmaker
may have to make additional findings.
Whitman also demonstrated that when a decisionmaker declines to follow
a staff recommendation that includes proposed findings, the decisionmaker
may be obligated to make additional findings. A subsequent case presented
this same issue in the CEQA context. (Environmental Council of Sacramento
v. Board of Supervisors of Sacramento County (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 428.)
Here, the Board adopted a supplemental EIR on a project, but contrary to
staff's recommendation, concluded that the impacts had been reduced to insignificance.
The court ruled that the Board must adopt complementary findings to meet
the Public Resources Code Section 21081 requirement to show how the impacts
had been mitigated.
2. Findings must be substantive, not just recitations of the law.
Generally, findings are not sufficient if they merely recite the very language
of the local ordinance or state statute that requires them. (Carmel-by-the-Sea
v. Board of Supervisors of Monterey County (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 84,
92.) For example, whenever a statute requires a local legislative body to
find that a proposal be consistent with the local general plan, the board
or council cannot discharge its responsibility by simply stating that there
is consistency. The decision making body must set forth the basis for the
consistency between the project and the plan. The mere recitation of statutes
is a self-serving exercise that is more conclusory than analytical. This
same principle applies to CEQA findings. (Village Laguna of Laguna Beach,
Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of Orange County (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d
1022.) A local agency must expressly reject as infeasible each mitigation
measure or project alternative identified in an EIR but not adopted in a
project approval in order to satisfy findings requirement of Public Resources
Code Sections 21081 and 15088 (now Section 15091). This documentation discloses
the decisionmaker's thinking process and satisfies the Topanga mandate
because it provides the intermediate analytical step linking the basic data
to the decision. However, there are some instances when statutorily required
findings are so detailed and precise that merely reciting them would satisfy
the Topanga mandate. (Jacobson v. County of Los Angeles (1977) 69
Cal.App.3d 374, 389-392.)
3. Findings need not be formal, but may be included in the agency's order
or resolution.
A pre-Topanga zoning decision held that the findings of a local commission,
composed of laymen, are expected to be informal, and that they are not required
to meet the standards of judicial findings of fact. (Swars v. Council
of City of Vallejo (1949) 33 Cal.2d 867, 872; and County of Santa
Barbara v. Purcell (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 169, 177.) In Hadley v.
Ontario (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 121, 128, the Court ruled that an administrative
agency's findings need not be formal, but may be included in the agency's
resolution. However, findings must be set forth clearly - they cannot be
vague or ambiguous. (Rural Land Owners Assn. v. City Council of Lodi
(1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 1013, 1023-1024.) Nevertheless, local agencies
have discretion in the manner that they record findings. Thus, findings
contained in the minutes and references to staff reports in motions will
satisfy the courts. On the other hand, a legislative body's debate and oral
remarks at a hearing are not sufficient to meet the Topanga requirements.
(Pacifica Corp. v. City of Camarillo (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 168, 179.)
An early environmental case established a related guideline regarding the
formality of findings, addressing EIRs and written findings required by
local ordinance. (Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972)
8 Cal.3d 247, 270.) The court determined that when an EIR provides the same
informational benefits that locally required written findings do, no additional
findings are required.
4. Administrative findings will not rescue a decision when an agency
has not followed the procedure required by law.
Failure to proceed in a manner required by law is a separate ground for
finding abuse of discretion. In a recent case, the court held that an additional
or supplemental EIR should have been performed when, after EIR certification,
a Board of Supervisors discovered that a proposed road would encroach on
a significant wetland. (Mira Monte Homeowners Assn. v. County of Ventura
(1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 357.) The fact that the Board had adopted findings
addressing wetlands pursuant to the original EIR was insufficient to consider
the full range of impacts, alternatives and mitigation measures when the
wetland extended further that the original project description contemplated.
Next:
PREPARATION OF FINDINGS: A QUESTION
OF TIMING AND JUSTIFICATION
Return to Table of Contents
Prepared by:
State of California
Governor's Office of Planning and Research
1400 Tenth Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
916-322-2318