|
|
 |
Reproduced by California Resources Agency with the
permission of LexisNexis. Copyright 2007
LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc.
All rights reserved. No copyright
is claimed as to any portion of the original work prepared by a government
officer or employee as part of that person’s official duties. WOODWARD
PARK HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF FRESNO et al., Defendants
and Respondents; DeWAYNE ZINKIN, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. F049481
COURT
OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 150
Cal. App. 4th 683;
58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 102; 2007 Cal. App. LEXIS 757 April
13, 2007, Filed NOTICE: As
Modified May 11, 2007. SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Later proceeding at Woodward Park
Homeowners Association, Inc. v. City of Fresno (Zinkin), 2007 Cal. LEXIS
6754 (Cal., June 18, 2007) Time for Granting or Denying Review
Extended Woodward Park Homeowners Association, Inc. v. City of Fresno
(Zinkin), 2007 Cal. LEXIS 8139 (Cal., July 13, 2007) Review denied by, Request denied by Woodward
v. City of Fresno, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 8199 (Cal., July 25, 2007) PRIOR-HISTORY: Superior Court of Fresno County, No. 05
CECG00058, Wayne R. Ellison, Judge. Woodward Park Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. City of Fresno, 149 Cal.
App. 4th 892, 2007 Cal. App. LEXIS 544 (Cal. App. 5th Dist., 2007) COUNSEL: Law Offices of Richard L. Harriman and
Richard L. Harriman for Plaintiffs and Appellants. James C. Sanchez, City Attorney, David P.
Hale, Assistant City Attorney, Kathryn Phelan, Deputy City Attorney; Burke,
Williams & Sorensen, Geralyn L. Skapik, Amy E. Morgan and Stefanie G. Field
for Defendants and Respondents. Motschiedler, Michaelides & Wishon,
James A. McKelvey and C. William Brewer for Real Party in Interest and Respondent. JUDGES: Wiseman, Acting P. J., with Cornell and
Dawson, JJ., concurring. OPINION BY: Wiseman OPINION WISEMAN, Acting P. J.--This case
concerns the City of Fresno's approval of a new commercial development on
vacant land near Woodward Park in Fresno. Invoking the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.),
two local organizations asked the superior court to set aside the city's
approval. The court declined. We will reverse the superior court's decision. As
we will explain, the city's actions violated CEQA and it must do the environmental
review process over if it wants to approve the project. One of
CEQA's two major purposes is to require public agencies to adopt feasible
mitigation measures to lessen the environmental impacts of the projects they
approve. In this case, the project was expected to impact an already congested
freeway interchange at State Route 41 and Friant Road. The city calculated a freeway impact fee of
the kind frequently imposed on developments in other cities, but throughout
almost the entire CEQA review process, the city took the position that it need
not impose the fee or any other freeway mitigation measure. It took this
position based on a long-standing Fresno policy of approving projects despite
unmitigated freeway impacts, a policy apparently arising from the city's dissatisfaction
with information provided to it by Caltrans.
The policy is illegal because CEQA does not allow agencies to approve
projects after refusing to require feasible mitigation measures for significant
impacts. If the project went ahead
without any freeway traffic mitigation, the driving public would be left
"holding the financial bag." At the
last minute, during the city council meeting at which the project was
approved, the city decided to accept
Zinkin's offer to pay a small freeway- impact fee. The fee was legally inadequate; as we will
explain, the amount was not supported by sufficient evidence. CEQA's
other major purpose is to inform the public and decision makers of the
consequences of environmental decisions before those decisions are made. In
this case, the city's review process failed to inform the public because the
two environmental documents the city produced--an environmental impact report
and a statement of overriding considerations--were deeply flawed. An
environmental impact report, as its name
suggests, is meant to report the environmental impacts a project will have. In
this case, the environmental impact report usually measured the project's
impacts by comparing it to a massive hypothetical office park, instead
of comparing it to the vacant land that actually exists at the project site.
This hypothetical office park was a legally incorrect baseline which
resulted in a misleading report of the project's impacts. A
statement of overriding considerations gives a public agency's reasons for
approving a project--its overriding considerations--even though the project
will have significant environmental impacts that cannot be substantially lessened
by mitigation measures. In this case, the statement of overriding
considerations engaged in a serious misrepresentation. It claimed that the
proposed project would have economic benefits superior to those of the three
alternatives considered in the environmental impact report because those
alternatives "generally propose no development or development to a lesser
degree." In reality, the three alternatives in the report were as large
as or larger than the proposed project, and the record contained no reason
to think their economic benefits would be smaller. The real difference was that
the proposed project included a shopping center--which was a primary target of
many members of the public opposed to the project--while the alternatives had
no shopping center or a smaller shopping center, but more office space. The
statement of overriding considerations camouflaged this difference by
substituting the unsupported claim about economic superiority. The
city's environmental review process failed to satisfy either of CEQA's two main
purposes. We will not speculate about why this happened, but a dissenting
member of the city council observed at the meeting in which the project was
approved that "we're talking about issues that ... a couple of years ago
we wouldn't have even discussed like EIR's ... and a developer putting [freeway
traffic impact mitigation fee] money into ... Caltrans." If, as this
comment suggests, the city's culture of CEQA compliance is only now emerging,
it would be a disservice to the public if a project of this magnitude were to
go forward based upon a foundation that is so flawed. FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORIES Real
party in interest DeWayne Zinkin, doing business as Zinkin Development Company,
LLC (Zinkin), obtained the approval of respondent City of Fresno (the city) to
build a development on a 38.93-acre parcel located immediately to the east of
the intersection of North Friant Road and North Fresno Street, one long block
from the interchange between Friant Road and State Route 41. The approved
project consisted of 274,000 square feet of office space and a
203,000-square-foot retail shopping center. Zinkin's proposal also tentatively
included 20 apartments, but the approval was not conditioned on the inclusion
of any apartments in the final plan. The actual number of apartments was to be
determined later, when the developer would submit a site plan and apply for a
conditional use permit. As the city explains in its brief, "[t]he 20 units
mentioned in the application [are] just a 'place holder,' included as part of
the conceptual plan." The
city's approval of the project was comprised of several distinct acts. First,
the city certified an environmental impact report (EIR) and a statement of
overriding considerations pursuant to CEQA (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et
seq.). 1
Then a portion of the property previously zoned for office and
residential uses was rezoned to permit construction of a shopping center.
Finally, the city amended the Fresno General Plan and the Woodward Park
Community Plan to permit construction of a shopping center on a portion of the
property. The plans previously designated this portion for office development.
The approval was subject to a number of conditions in addition to the
mitigation measures set forth in the EIR, including approval of a master
conditional use permit and a site plan; exclusion of a supermarket (but allowance
of a large specialty grocery store); and
construction of improvements to the streets bordering the property. 1 Subsequent statutory references are to the
Public Resources Code unless indicated otherwise. Like
all EIR's, the EIR in this case evaluated the environmental impacts of the
proposed project by comparing the project's environmental effects with the
preexisting environmental baseline at the site without the project. According
to the Guidelines for the Implementation of the California Environmental
Quality Act (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15000 et seq.; hereafter
Guidelines), the environmental baseline on the basis of which the environmental
impacts of the project are to be measured normally is the physical condition of
the project site at the time the notice of preparation of the EIR is published.
(Guidelines, § 15125, subd. (a).) In this case, the project site was
(and still is) a vacant lot. The EIR does not contain an explicit statement
of the baseline it used. In setting forth the project's impacts on air
pollution and traffic congestion (the main points at issue in the subsequent
litigation), however, the EIR compared the project's impacts with those of a
large-scale (more than 600,000 square feet) office and office-related retail
development that could be built consistently with the existing zoning and plan
designations. The traffic congestion study also examined area traffic without
any development on the site (i.e., the traffic presently existing), but the air
pollution study compared the proposed project's emissions only with the emissions
that would be associated with an office development allowed under existing
zoning, not a vacant lot. In its
air pollution discussion, the EIR noted that Fresno County is a nonattainment
area (i.e., an area in which regulatory thresholds are exceeded) for ozone and
10-micron particulate matter (referred to as PM10), and that any net increase
in these pollutants is considered significant. The EIR compared, on the one
hand, emissions of PM10 and ozone precursors (referred to as ROG and NOx)
associated with operating the office project allowable under existing zoning,
with, on the other hand, emissions of the same pollutants that would be associated
with operating the proposed project. It found that the proposed project
"generates slightly more emissions" than the chosen baseline. The EIR
then stated (1) that because the project is in a nonattainment area, certain
mitigation measures should be incorporated into the project; (2) that a
significant, unavoidable impact to NOx emissions would remain in spite of these
measures; and (3) that emissions associated with operating the project would
otherwise be insignificant with mitigation. The EIR also called for mitigation
measures to limit the emissions of PM10 associated with dust caused by the
actual construction of the project, measures it said would render the
construction impact insignificant. The EIR's traffic discussion included comments
on both surface streets and the nearby freeway, State Route 41, and its on- and
off-ramps on Friant Road. The discussion of surface streets includes tables
comparing, on a scale of A to F (F being the worst), existing traffic and
existing traffic plus project-generated traffic at several intersections and
road segments surrounding and adjoining the project site. It concluded that the
project would cause one street segment and two intersections to fall from
acceptable levels of service, defined as D or better, to E or F. The
discussion of surface streets also compared traffic at the surrounding street
segments and intersections with and without the project in 2025. It concluded
that, with or without the project, three street segments will operate at level
C or D in 2025, while the remaining eight segments will operate at level F.
Also, with or without the project, all nine intersections studied will operate
at unacceptable levels in 2025. As mitigation measures for surface streets,
the EIR called for the construction of a new lane on the project's side of
Friant Road, widening of the approaches to several intersections, synchronizing
of existing traffic signals, and installation of two new traffic signals.
Significant, unavoidable impacts to surface street traffic would remain after
mitigation. This is because achieving nonfailing levels of service would
require the addition of lanes to several of the surrounding streets, for which
"[r]ight-of-way costs would be too significant ... ." The
EIR's discussion of freeway traffic was brief but generated substantial
controversy. The final circulated draft of the EIR included an impact
mitigation fee figure in a table titled "SR 41 Project-Related Trip Impact
and Fair Share Estimate." This table shows projected peak-hour trips
generated by the project at several points in the interchange between State
Route 41 and Friant Road. It stated that the trip-generation figures were
estimated using the Council of Fresno County Governments' regional traffic
model. For each point in the interchange, the table showed a cost per trip.
These figures were supplied by Caltrans. The table then multiplied the cost per
trip by the number of trips for each point in the interchange and totaled the
results. It showed a total fair share estimate of $31,155. Having
calculated the $31,155 figure, the EIR then declined to require the developer
to pay it, stating: "It is noted that Caltrans did not provide a source
document or 'nexus study' for the cost per trip by improvement or segment along
SR 41 identified in [the table]. In the absence of such documentation by
Caltrans, such fees have not been required as mitigation or conditions of
approval by the City of Fresno." The
EIR went on to state that, because the proposed project would generate fewer
total peak-hour trips than a project allowable under existing zoning, "the
assessment of fees to address project-related impacts along SR 41 may not be
appropriate," even apart from the issue of Caltrans's failure to deliver
the desired information. The city "does not object," however, to the
developer paying the fee "voluntarily." After
the EIR was circulated in draft form, Caltrans submitted a comment letter
responding to these remarks. It stated that the city had all the information it
needed and that, in any event, as the lead agency, the city had a legal duty to
require mitigation of all the significant impacts it identified. It also argued
that, because no freeway traffic impact mitigation was required when the
existing zoning was put in place in 1990, a comparison between impacts from a
project that could be built under that
zoning and the proposed project was irrelevant. Caltrans also disputed the amount of the fee.
It stated that, among other, smaller deficiencies, the EIR failed to reflect
157 project-generated evening peak-hour trips traveling on a proposed southbound
auxiliary lane between the Friant and Herndon exits. With these, the fee amount
would be $445,817. The letter further stated that in 1998, Zinkin agreed to pay
a voluntary impact mitigation fee of $37,500 for another project, but never
paid it. In its
responses to public comments in the final EIR, the city made some adjustments,
increasing its fee calculation to $43,897. It disputed the bulk of the
difference between its and Caltrans's figures, saying that, although the
project would generate 157 trips in the southbound auxiliary lane between
Friant and Herndon, project traffic would use only part of that lane.
Caltrans did not supply a figure or methodology for determining this partial
use, so the city set the fee for it at zero. The city still was not
requiring the developer to pay any amount and recited a variety of reasons for
its policy of allowing impacts of this kind to stand unmitigated. Regarding the
voluntary $37,500 fee in the 1998 case, the city stated that Zinkin never paid
this amount because Caltrans "verbally rejected" it. Caltrans
replied, accepting the assertion that project traffic would not use all of the
auxiliary lane. It reduced its fee calculation to $306,558. It also responded
to the city's request that it explain its methodology by supplying the worksheets
it used in making its calculations. Arguing against the city's stated policy of
refusing to demand that developers pay freeway traffic mitigation fees,
Caltrans observed that "it is common practice throughout the State of California
for a Lead Agency to require mitigation for State Highways as a condition of
project approval ... ." It denied that it ever rejected the $37,500 for
the earlier project and stated that it has requested this payment multiple
times without response by the city or applicant.2 2 After this court originally issued its
opinion in this case, the city and Zinkin requested that we take judicial
notice of an agreement between Caltrans and Zinkin executed May 30, 2006,
relating to the earlier project. The request is granted. This agreement describes Zinkin's 1998 offer
and states that Caltrans accepted it in 2000, contradicting the city's
assertion during the CEQA review process in this case that Caltrans had rejected
the offer. The agreement states that Zinkin and Caltrans then
"negotiated" a payment of $27,000. In his request for judicial notice
and accompanying papers, Zinkin does not deny that the original offer and
acceptance were for $37,500 and does not claim that the agreement for that
amount was ever honored. At the meeting in which the city council
approved the project, Zinkin's attorney proposed to have the city impose a fee
of $45,000 "in a spirit of compromise" in light of the fact that
"expert opinion as reflected in the EIR" ranges from "$0 -
$306,000." The attorney claimed that "there is no legitimate basis
for imposing that," but "we volunteered to have that imposed."
Later in the meeting, a council member moved to approve the project, mentioning
the $45,000 payment in his motion. The city attorney asked the council for
"clarification" of whether "[t]he $45,000 voluntary mitigation
fee" would be added to the resolution certifying the final EIR. She never
received clarification during the meeting. A version of the proposal (for
$43,897) did, however, appear in the council's resolution certifying the EIR.
We will set forth the details of the adopted version later in this opinion. 3 3 After this court originally issued its
opinion in this case, the city and Zinkin filed a request for rehearing or
modification, supplying for the first time a citation to the administrative
record supporting their claim that the city council's resolution certifying the
EIR included a freeway-related measure.
The city and Zinkin claimed in their original briefing that the city's
approval included this measure, but their record citations did not bear out the
claim. They claimed this again in their
supplemental briefing after this court's briefing letter stated that there
appeared to be no freeway traffic impact mitigation measure (and after the
court granted an extension of time to a date stipulated to by all parties), but
again their record citations failed to substantiate the claim. The court specifically asked them for a
citation at oral argument, but again they failed to supply one that bore out
the claim and failed to request leave to file a letter brief supplying
one. Finally, after employing new
appellate counsel, they produced the correct citation (pages 2022 and 2567 of
the administrative record) in their request for rehearing or modification. They also asserted that, previously, the
court did not give them a sufficient opportunity to address this issue. The procedural history just recited refutes
this assertion. Needless to say, it is
counsel's responsibility to supply correct record citations in support of all
factual assertions. The opportunities
for doing so were more than adequate. We
have, however, modified the opinion in the interest of accuracy to reflect the
facts belatedly brought to our attention. The EIR discussed another set of impacts
under the heading "Land Use and Planning." This discussion concerned
the inconsistency of the project with the city's general plan and the Woodward
Park Community Plan. The EIR explained that the plans designated the site
for office development, not for offices and a shopping center, but that the proposed
plan amendment would change this designation and eliminate the discrepancy. The
EIR also stated that the Woodward Park Community Plan includes a policy
limiting the amount of retail development in the Woodward Park
neighborhood according to a formula tied to population growth. The shopping
center component of the project would exceed these limits. The EIR asserted,
however, that the city's general plan had an overriding provision that included
the project site in a classification called the Woodward Park Activity
Center, which was exempt from the Community Plan's retail development limitations.
The EIR characterized the project's inconsistency with the Community Plan as a
potentially significant impact, but concluded that no mitigation was required
because of inclusion of the project site in the activity center. Additional
impacts on land use and planning, including exceeding an existing single-story
limitation on part of the property and impairing trail access, were found to be
insignificant with mitigation measures. The
project's other impacts were discussed under the headings of geology and soils,
biotic resources, noise, drainage, public facilities and services, aesthetics,
and cultural resources. None of these are at issue in this appeal. About each of them, the EIR either found the
project's impacts insignificant or required mitigation measures that would
render them insignificant. There were two exceptions. First, the site would
look different after development and, even with mitigation measures, this would
be a significant, unavoidable aesthetic impact. Second, the project would create
light and glare. The EIR described this as a potentially significant impact but
required no mitigation. Like
all EIR's, the EIR in this case discussed possible alternatives to the project.
CEQA requires discussion of project alternatives in order to provide decision
makers and the public with a reasonable picture of the range of feasible
choices with lesser environmental impacts. (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subds.
(a)-(d).) Every EIR must include a "no project alternative" in
order to "allow decisionmakers to compare the impacts of approving the
proposed project with the impacts of not approving the proposed project."
(Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (e)(1).)
The no-project alternative must discuss "existing conditions"
without the project but must also examine "what would be reasonably
expected to occur in the foreseeable future if the project were not approved
... ." (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (e)(2).) In
this case, the EIR discussed three alternatives to the proposed project. Under
the heading "No Project Alternative," the last draft EIR stated that
"[t]he site would remain vacant but could be developed with offices as
allowed by current planning and zoning designations." This suggested that
the no-project alternative might have been either a vacant lot or the maximum
office construction allowable under existing zoning. Apparently in response to
public comments, the final EIR removed this ambiguity, saying "[t]he No
Project alternative is considered office development according to existing
zoning." It was already clear, however, from the final draft EIR's
analysis that no comparison of the project with a vacant lot was ever intended.
It says the no-project alternative "has the potential to slightly
reduce" "impacts to resources including traffic, air quality, and
noise" relative to the proposed project. The no-project alternative might
"generate about 1/2 the daily trips" and thus would "reduce
impacts from traffic," while air pollution impacts would be "reduced
slightly"; "[i]mpacts to geology and soils would be similar in that
100% site development would occur," and other impacts would also be
similar. In all this, it is obvious that the no-project discussion compares the
proposed project's impacts only with those of maximum office construction under
existing zoning, not with the existing physical situation. Although
the EIR's section on alternatives did not say how large the maximum project
allowable under existing zoning would be, other parts of the EIR did. Under
existing zoning, an office park of 694,000 square feet could be built,
consisting of 548,000 square feet of office space and 146,000 square feet of
office-related retail space. The proposed project is 477,000 square feet, consisting of 274,000 square
feet of office space, 203,000 square feet of community commercial (i.e.,
shopping center) space, plus 20 (or more or fewer) apartments, as we have said. The
second alternative was called "Planned Office Development." This was
an office development of 652,000 square feet, consisting of 489,000 square feet
of office space and 163,000 square feet of office-related retail space, plus
135 apartments. Overall trip generation would be less than with the proposed
project by about 3,000 trips per day, but peak-hour traffic would be greater.
Air pollution impacts would be less because of the smaller traffic impacts.
Demands on public services would be greater because of the larger number of
apartments. Other impacts would be about the same. The
third alterative was called "Reduced Intensity Alternative." The
EIR's original description of this alternative obscured its actual scope. It
stated that "[f]or the southern half of the property, it is estimated that
commercial [i.e., shopping center] uses would occupy 88,000 square feet, and
office uses 140,000 square feet." The description said "[t]he balance
of the project site would be developed with increased office uses," but
did not say what quantity of development that would involve. In the final EIR's
responses to comment letters, it was made clear that the Reduced Intensity
Alternative has a total of 414,000 square feet of office space. The total
square footage of this alternative is thus 502,000. The
EIR concluded that the Reduced Intensity Alternative would generate 2,100 fewer
trips than the proposed project. It also
stated, however, that peak-hour traffic could be greater. Air pollution impacts
would be less because of the smaller traffic impacts. Other impacts would be
similar to those of the proposed project. After
describing the three alternatives and comparing them with the proposed project,
the EIR compared the alternatives with one another. Although the three
alternatives were similar to each other in that they all would cause somewhat
less air pollution, somewhat less traffic congestion except at peak hours, and
minimal differences with respect to other impacts when compared with the
proposed project, the EIR found that the Planned Office Development was
"the environmentally superior alternative for the project site." That
alternative was, however, "not feasible from the applicant's standpoint"
because it lacked a shopping center. Office-related retail space was included,
but under the limitations of that type of retail, "it would be virtually
impossible to develop the planned office development alternative with the
maximum allocation of 25% of the site in commercial uses." The Reduced
Intensity Alternative did include a shopping center, but this alternative was
also "not feasible from the developer's standpoint" because it
would not include a supermarket.
"Without the supermarket, leasing becomes difficult, and revenues to the
developer are generally not sufficient to support enhanced architecture and other
quality commercial features." Further, shopping centers in Fresno without
supermarkets "are usually smaller strip centers that struggle with
vacancies and have aesthetic, landscaping, and signage issues." The
proposed project did originally include a supermarket, but the city refused to
approve that component and prohibited a supermarket in the resolutions
approving the project. City staff concluded that the supermarket would generate
too much peak-hour traffic. This did not cause the developer to abandon the
project as infeasible. The
proposed project and the three alternatives set forth in the EIR are summarized
in the following table: ________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ Due to
the fact that the city decided to approve the project even though the EIR found
significant, unavoidable air and traffic impacts that would not be mitigated to
an insignificant level, a statement of overriding considerations was required.
(§ 21081, subd. (b).) This is a
statement in writing, supported by substantial evidence in the record, of
"specific economic, legal, social, technological, or other benefits"
of the proposed project that "outweigh the unavoidable adverse
environmental effects ... ." (Guidelines, § 15093, subd. (a).)
Notes in the Guidelines describe this as a "balancing statement" setting
forth the agency's "views on the ultimate balancing of the merits of
approving the project despite the environmental damage." (Guidelines,
discussion foll. § 15093.) The
statement of overriding considerations found that the project was justified
despite the significant, unavoidable impacts because "[t]he other
alternatives would offer a lesser variety of employment opportunities,
less available services for the
community and less available housing." It uses other formulations to make
the same points: "The benefits of providing a mixed use development with a
diverse variety of office uses together with commercial goods and services and
residential uses within a given neighborhood would be reduced with any of the
proposed alternatives"; "[t]he proposed mixed use project is superior
to the alternatives which would propose less intense projects with a lesser
range of employment opportunities within close proximity to the surrounding
residential community." These asserted advantages of the proposed project
may be summarized as follows: (i) it will generate more economic activity,
including creation of a variety of jobs, than the alternatives, and (ii) it
will serve the goal of providing mixed uses better than the alternatives. The
statement of overriding considerations found that "the benefits identified
... are each one, in and of themselves, sufficient to make a determination that
the adverse environmental effects are acceptable." The
claimed benefits of the proposed project are based in large measure on the
assertions that the alternatives considered in the EIR "generally propose
no development or development to a lesser degree" and that under the
no-project alternative, "the project site would remain vacant." In
other words, at least with respect to the amount (as opposed to the variety or
mixture) of economic activity the project would promote, the statement's
finding is that the proposed project has greater benefits than the alternatives
because it is larger or more intensive. The
assertion that the proposed project was larger or more intensive than the
alternatives was not consistent with the EIR's description of those
alternatives. As we have just seen, the alternatives considered in the EIR did
not "generally propose no development or development to a lesser
degree" and the no-project alternative described in the EIR was not one in
which "the project site would remain vacant." The no-project
alternative was more than 200,000 square feet larger than the office and
commercial part of the proposed project. Unless the 20 apartments would
comprise a whopping 10,000 square feet each--four to five times the size of a
typical detached house--the no-project alternative was actually a more
intensive development than the proposed project. The record contains no
information about the proposed size of the apartments, which are, as the city
says, only a place holder; the actual number could be zero. The
Planned Office Development was also a larger development. It contemplated
175,000 more square feet of commercial and office development and 115 more
apartments than the proposed project. The so-called Reduced Intensity
Alternative was about as large as the proposed project. It included no apartments, but its office and shopping
center combined were larger than the
commercial portions of the proposed project by 25,000 square feet (502,000
versus 477,000). The
real difference between the proposed project and the alternatives described in the
EIR was that the alternatives had office-related retail instead of a shopping
center or had a smaller shopping center. The statement of overriding considerations
contained no discussion of why a large office development with office-related
retail space should deliver a smaller quantity of economic benefits than a
smaller office development with a shopping center. Members
of the public commented extensively on the EIR before it was certified.
Numerous comment letters and extensive public comments at the city council
meeting and the planning commission meeting are included in the administrative
record. The comments were detailed and covered a wide variety of topics,
including air pollution; traffic congestion (together with freeway traffic
impact mitigation fees); the appropriate mix of land uses; whether a vacant lot
or the maximum project buildable under existing zoning was the appropriate
basis of comparison for determining the project's environmental impacts; and
whether the EIR's consideration of project alternatives was sufficient. It does
not appear that the statement of overriding considerations was made available
to the public before the city council meeting at which approval was granted
(the document's header reads "City Council Hearing December 7, 2004,"
the date of the meeting, and no version of it was attached to earlier drafts of
the EIR in the record), but Woodward Park's counsel mentioned it orally
at the meeting and it was a subject of critical discussion by one of the
council's members during the meeting. A city staff report presented to the
planning commission and city council also raised a wide variety of issues. After
the city approved the project, appellants Woodward Park Homeowners
Association, Inc., and Valley Advocates (collectively, Woodward Park)
filed a petition for a writ of mandate in superior court, asking the court to
reverse the city's action. The petition named the city and city council as
defendants and Zinkin as a real party in interest. It also named Caltrans and
the San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District as real parties in
interest, stating that they were responsible agencies. The
petition alleged five causes of action. The first was "Failure to Require
Feasible Mitigation for Significant Cumulative Traffic Impacts" in
violation of CEQA. This cause of action referred to the city's refusal to impose
the impact mitigation fee proposed by Caltrans for the project's burden on the
interchange between State Route 41 and Friant Road. It alleged that the
city has "persistently and
obdurately ... refused to comply with the mandate of CEQA that significant
adverse effects of ... projects shall be ... mitigated where ...
feasible." The
second cause of action alleged "Inadequate Analysis of Cumulative Impacts
to Air Quality" in violation of CEQA. It stated that the city "failed
to require a quantitative analysis of what beneficial impacts the mitigation
measures requested by Caltrans would have caused in the vicinity," and
"failed to provide a quantitative study or analysis of the potentially
significant adverse impacts to public health in the" area. The
third cause of action alleged another CEQA violation and was headed
"Inadequate Analysis of Project Alternatives; Failure to Require the Environmentally
Superior Alternative." It asserted that the city failed to "make a
good faith effort" in its
consideration of alternatives and should have considered and approved "a
true 'mixed use' land plan with substantially more residential dwelling units ...
." The
fourth cause of action alleged that, by approving the project and amending the
city's general plan, the city rendered the general plan internally inconsistent
and inconsistent with the Woodward Park Community Plan and thereby
violated Government Code section 65300.5. It asserted that the plans
contemplated 20 to 50 percent housing in new development projects in the area
and that the proposed project did not include nearly that amount. The
fifth cause of action, "Improper Procedure Used to Adopt Statement of
Overriding Considerations," alleged an additional CEQA violation. It
asserted that the statement of overriding considerations was "not supported
by substantial credible evidence in the record"; "failed to utilize
the proper 'weighing and balancing' procedure ... in that there is no
quantification of economic costs associated with" air and traffic impacts;
and proceeded "without requiring the mitigation measures demanded by
Caltrans," "without requiring ... Zinkin to provide adequate
mitigation for the cumulative traffic impacts caused by the other projects
developed by him in the Friant Road expressway corridor," and
"without supporting the alleged 'cost-benefit' analysis with quantified
and credible substantial evidence." Before
the trial court ruled on the petition, Woodward Park voluntarily
dismissed Caltrans as a party. It also "waive[d]" its "claim in
this action, based upon inadequate mitigation for the future ramp improvements
at State Highway 41 and Friant Road, as alleged in the First Cause of Action
... ." In its ruling, the trial court first stated
that Woodward Park had withdrawn its first cause of action. Although the
fifth cause of action also referred to traffic impacts, the court interpreted
the withdrawal of the first as "waiv[ing] any claims based on inadequate
mitigation of traffic impacts relating to the approved project." On the
second cause of action (relating to air impacts), the court concluded that the
EIR's analysis was adequate. It found that the EIR examined the region's air
pollution conditions and the pertinent regulatory standards; "discusse[d] ... and analyze[d] the
pollutants likely to be created by the project"; considered the project's
cumulative impact on regional air quality; "acknowledge[d] the known
connection between many of the pollutants likely to be created by the project,
and serious health consequences, including the connection between: ozone
emissions and impaired respiratory function, PM10 particulates and lung damage,
carbon monoxide and cardiovascular disease, and nitrogen dioxide and its
adverse effects on human respiratory and immune systems." The court noted
that "[t]he EIR conclude[d] that pollutants created by the project will
not exceed regional state and federal emissions standards, but acknowledge[d]
that the cumulative impact on regional air quality is significant and largely
unavoidable. " This was adequate, the court ruled: "Whatever else
might have been said about the health effects of reduced air quality, the EIR
provides adequate notice to the lead agency, other public agencies and the
general public of the health consequences which may result from adding more pollutants
to a nonattainment basin." On the
third cause of action (inadequate consideration of project alternatives), the court found that the EIR evaluated
reasonable alternatives and the city had no obligation to consider an
alternative with more housing because there was no evidence that more housing
would reduce any environmental impacts. Woodward Park's "conclusion
that an alternative project with a greater number of residential units than
that approved could substantially lessen any such environmental effects is
wholly without support in the administrative record." Ruling
against Woodward Park on its fourth cause of action (general plan
inconsistency), the court observed that the reference in the general plan to 20
to 50 percent housing in mixed-use developments is an advisory guideline, not a
binding requirement. The 20-to-50-percent figure is set forth in a model
ordinance included in a document called "Landscape of Choice--Principles
& Strategies," which in turn was adopted as an exhibit to the general
plan. Policy C-8-b of the general plan "encourages the use of that Model
Ordinance in the development of mixed use projects," but "makes clear
that the Ordinance itself is only a guide for such development." Finally, the court ruled against Woodward
Park on its fifth cause of action (inadequate analysis in statement of
overriding considerations) on the ground that statements of overriding
considerations are not required to be quantitative in nature. Often, it stated,
adequate overriding considerations "are generalized reasons for approving
a project, such as creating more jobs, generating taxes and the like."
CEQA requires that an agency "weigh and balance the economic and other
benefits of the project against its environmental risks," but demands
"no cost-benefit analysis" and does not compel an agency "to
quantify the adverse environmental effects of a project, in terms of cost ...
." According to the court, the statement "[set] forth the City's
findings as to the significant and unavoidable effects of the project,
including the cumulative effects on air quality in the Valley, and the City's
determination that the project was acceptable, in spite of those unavoidable
effects, because of the economic and other benefits of the project." This
determination was supported by substantial evidence, the court ruled, so the
statement was adequate. Having rejected all of Woodward Park's claims,
the court denied the petition. In its
opening brief on appeal, Woodward Park again narrowed the issues,
limiting its contentions to its second (air impacts), fourth (general plan
inconsistency), and fifth (analysis in statement of overriding considerations)
causes of action. In its discussion of air impacts, the brief argues that the
EIR failed "to analyze adequately the cumulative impacts to air
quality," and more specifically that it did not "correlate the
acknowledged adverse impacts to air quality to resultant adverse health effects
... ." Regarding plan consistency, Woodward Park contends that the
20-to-50-percent-housing reference in documents annexed to the general plan is
a binding rule, not an advisory guideline. The brief's discussion of the
statement of overriding considerations reiterates both the general contentions
that the statement lacked sufficient " 'weighing and balancing' " and
was unsupported by substantial evidence and the more specific claim that the
statement lacked "quantification" of costs arising from traffic congestion
and air-pollution-induced health impacts. The city and Zinkin, in separate
briefs, undertook to rebut these contentions. On the day Woodward Park's
reply brief was due, its counsel informed the clerk's office that he would be
filing the brief as soon as he could. The reply brief was never filed. Subsequently,
we issued a briefing letter, asking the parties to submit supplemental briefs
addressing five issues: (A) By measuring the project's impacts against the
impacts of a large office park allowable under existing zoning, rather
than a vacant lot, did the EIR choose an
environmental baseline that was incorrect as a matter of law? (B) By
defining the no-project alternative as a large office park allowable
under existing zoning, rather than a vacant lot, did the EIR define the
no-project alternative incorrectly as a matter of law? (C) When the statement
of overriding considerations based its
finding of overriding economic benefits on a misdescription of the
project alternatives considered in the EIR, did the statement fatally
compromise its integrity as an informational document and were its findings
unsupported by substantial evidence? (D) Was the city's refusal 4 to require feasible mitigation measures
for acknowledged freeway traffic impacts erroneous as a matter of law, and is
the error cognizable under the fifth cause of action even though the first was
withdrawn? (E) Did Woodward Park fail to exhaust administrative remedies
with respect to the foregoing issues or fail to take action in the trial court
to preserve them for appeal? Woodward Park, the city, and Zinkin
submitted supplemental briefs addressing these issues. 4 As noted in footnote 3 above, the parties supplied
no citation to the record showing that any freeway-related measure was included
in the city council's resolution certifying the EIR until after this court
filed its original opinion in this case.
DISCUSSION Standards of review If a
CEQA petition challenges agency action that is quasi-adjudicatory in character,
the trial court's role is only to determine whether the action is supported by
substantial evidence in the record. (§ 21168.) If the agency action was
quasi-legislative in character, the trial court reviews the action for abuse of
discretion. The agency abuses its discretion if it does not proceed in the
manner required by law or if the decision is not supported by substantial
evidence. (§ 21168.5.) " 'Substantial evidence' " is defined
in the Guidelines as "enough relevant information and reasonable inferences
from this information that a fair argument can be made to support a conclusion,
even though other conclusions might also be reached." (Guidelines, §
15384, subd. (a).) The formulations in sections 21168 and 21168.5
embody essentially the same standard of review. Both require the trial court to
determine whether the agency acted in a manner contrary to law and whether its
determinations were supported by substantial evidence, and neither permits the
court to make its own factual findings. (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v.
Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 392, fn. 5 [253 Cal.
Rptr. 426, 764 P.2d 278]; Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v.
Hensler (1991) 233 Cal. App. 3d 577, 589-590 [284 Cal. Rptr. 498].) The
Court of Appeal reviews the trial court's decision de novo, applying the same
standards to the agency's action as the trial court applies. (Neighbors of
Cavitt Ranch v. County of Placer (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1100 [131 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 379].) A similarly deferential standard is applicable
to Woodward Park's claim under Government Code section 65300.5.
The city's determination that the project was consistent with the general plan
and the Woodward Park Community Plan can be overturned by a reviewing
court only if the city abused its discretion. It abused its discretion only if
its determination was not based on findings or the findings were not based on
substantial evidence. (Families Unafraid to Uphold Rural etc. County v.
Board of Supervisors (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1338 [74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1].) I. Foundational defects in the
environmental documents The
city approved two environmental documents, an EIR and a statement of overriding
considerations. The EIR has often been called the heart of CEQA. (Laurel
Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1993) 6
Cal.4th 1112, 1123 [26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 231, 864 P.2d 502].) It is an informational document whose purpose
is to inform the public and decision makers of the environmental consequences
of agency decisions before they are made. (Ibid.) Beyond this
informational purpose, an EIR can lead to affirmative legal obligations for
agencies: They are required to "mitigate or avoid the significant effects
on the environment" identified in an EIR "whenever it is feasible to
do so" if they approve projects that have significant effects. (§
21002.1, subd. (b).) Agencies are permitted to approve projects with
significant environmental impacts, even if there are no feasible mitigation
measures, if they find that overriding considerations justify the approval.
Those considerations must be set forth in a statement of overriding considerations
and supported by substantial evidence. (§ 21081; Guidelines, § 15093.)
Both documents were fundamentally defective in this case and failed to satisfy
legal requirements. A. Environmental baseline 1. Applicable law The
Guidelines state that an EIR must contain a description of the environmental
setting of the project and that this description must describe the actual
physical conditions of the project site when the notice of preparation of the
EIR is published. Further, and crucially in this case, the existing physical
conditions "will normally constitute the baseline physical conditions by
which a lead agency determines whether an impact is significant."
(Guidelines, § 15125, subd. (a).) Also, "[w]here a proposed project
is compared with an adopted plan, the analysis shall examine the existing physical
conditions at the time the notice of preparation is published ... as well as
the potential future conditions
discussed in the plan." (Guidelines, § 15125, subd. (e).) These
requirements protect the fundamental essence of an EIR, its evaluation of a
project's environmental impacts. They protect this, in cases where the proposed
project is actual construction, by ensuring that the evaluation of impacts
normally will do what common sense says it should do and what the EIR's most
important audience, the public, will naturally assume it does: compare what
will happen if the project is built with what will happen if the site is left
alone. To put
the point a bit differently: If an EIR for a construction project on vacant
land uses something other than vacant land as its baseline, the EIR will report
only a portion of the impacts the project will have. For instance, if a hypothetical
project half the size of the proposed project is used as a baseline, the EIR
will report only half the project's impact. The EIR would fail to inform the
public of the other half. It would also necessarily lack consideration of
mitigation measures for the omitted portion of the project's impact. 2. Analysis: actual vacant land versus
hypothetical office park In
this case, the EIR acknowledged that the project site was presently a vacant
lot. It then went on in many instances, however, to evaluate environmental
impacts by comparing the project's impacts with those of the maximum buildable
development under existing zoning and plan designations. The question presented
is whether this approach satisfied the requirement that the EIR evaluate
impacts by comparing the project to
existing physical conditions. The
city and Zinkin contend that the EIR conformed to the Guidelines because it
evaluated the proposed project's impacts in relation to both a vacant
lot and a large development permissible under existing zoning and plan
designations. If the EIR actually did this, its treatment of the baseline would
be legally correct. Where, as here, the agency's action includes alteration of
a previously adopted plan, the EIR (normally) still must compare the project
with "existing physical conditions" but should also compare it with
"potential future conditions discussed in the plan." (Guidelines, §
15125, subd. (e).) The second comparison is important because, among other
reasons, it enables the public and decision makers to identify possible
inconsistencies between the proposed project and the previously adopted plan.
(See discussion foll. Guidelines, § 15125.) This
"two-baselines approach" only works if the EIR actually carries out
both comparisons. That did not happen in this case. Instead, the EIR had a
dominant theme of comparing the proposed project with buildout under existing zoning, combined with a scattered,
partial discussion of some of the project's impacts relative to vacant land. As we
have said, the EIR's traffic discussion did include a comparison of existing
traffic with existing traffic plus project-generated traffic. It contained a
description of existing air pollution. It also referenced a vacant lot as the
point of comparison in describing some of the project's minor impacts. For
example, it stated that the project will have an unavoidable aesthetic impact
because it will look different from a vacant lot, and its discussion of impacts
on biotic resources implicitly compared the project with a vacant lot by
considering the need to remove and relocate certain species, if found. Despite
this, the EIR's bottom-line conclusions on the major impacts at issue
emphasized the marginally increased impacts of the proposed project over
buildout under existing zoning. The section of the air pollution discussion
labeled "Impacts" set forth tables comparing air pollution that would
be caused by buildout under existing zoning with pollution that would be caused
by the proposed project. It then says the operation of the project would
produce "slightly" more air pollution than the large office park
allowable under existing zoning, without saying whether the increase is more
than slight relative to the vacant land. In the traffic discussion, a repeated
emphasis is that by some measures the proposed project would generate less
traffic than a project buildable under existing zoning and plan designations.
In several places, it is stated that, while existing designations for the
project site included a cap of 12,400 trips per day, the proposed project was
projected to generate only 12,297 trips per day, so building the project would
reduce traffic by that measure. Tellingly, however, the EIR stated in another
section that the no-project alternative--which the EIR also defined as a large
office park buildable under existing zoning--might generate "about
1/2 the daily trips" the project would generate. This means that, although
the proposed project's trip generation will come in under the 12,400-trip cap,
a development allowed under existing zoning would come in well under
that cap. In effect, the EIR used the trip cap as a third baseline to
make the project's impacts look even smaller than the
development-under-existing-zoning baseline did. Elsewhere, the EIR found that
the project would generate less peak-hour traffic than a project buildable
under existing zoning. In any event, this
thinking is obviously not based on a comparison of the proposed project
with a vacant lot. The
upshot of all this is that the EIR never presented a clear or a complete
description of the project's impacts compared with the effects of leaving the
land in its existing state. Readers who have been told that the air pollution impact is slight and that the traffic
generated will be less than the given benchmark should not have to stop and
puzzle it out that these conclusions are based on a comparison with a large
office park that is not, in fact, there. Those who did puzzle it out
were still left wondering whether the impacts would be slight or major in relation
to vacant land. Due to
these problems, the EIR in this case is closely analogous to two EIR's the
Court of Appeal found to be legally inadequate in Environmental Planning
& Information Council v. County of El Dorado (1982) 131 Cal. App. 3d 350
[182 Cal. Rptr. 317] (EPIC). One area of a county had 418 residents
and another had 3,800. (Id. at p. 358.) The existing county general plan
established a population-holding capacity for the first area of 70,400 and for
the second of 63,600. A proposed plan amendment would have reduced the capacity
figures to 5,800 and 22,400. The EIR's described the proposed plan amendment's
impacts by saying that the drastic reductions in the population-capacity
figures meant the adoption of the amendment would have no adverse environmental
impacts. (Id. at pp. 357-358.) The
appellate court found the EIR's deficient because they should have compared the
plan amendment to the existing state of the physical environment, not to the
existing plan. "CEQA nowhere calls for evaluation of the impacts of a
proposed project on an existing general plan; it concerns itself with the
impacts of the project on the environment, defined as the existing physical
conditions in the affected area. The legislation evinces no interest in the
effects of proposed general plan amendments on an existing general plan, but
instead has clearly expressed concern with the effects of projects on the
actual environment upon which the proposal will operate." (EPIC, supra,
131 Cal. App. 3d at p. 354.) Since the EIR's at issue compared the
amendments with hypothetical conditions contemplated by the existing plan and
not with actual existing physical conditions, those EIR's "can only
mislead the public as to the reality of the impacts and subvert full
consideration of the actual environmental impacts which would result." (Id.
at p. 358.) A point of similarity between EPIC and the present case
is that there, as here, it was "true that the [EIR's] do discuss certain
physical impacts upon the existing environment, but such information must be
painstakingly ferreted out of the [EIR's]." (Id. at p. 357.) A
number of other cases reach similar conclusions. (See, e.g., City of
Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Board of Supervisors (1986) 183 Cal. App. 3d 229, 246 [227
Cal. Rptr. 899] [agency must consider impacts of rezoning on existing
physical environment; comparison of project possible under old zoning with
project possible under proposed new zoning "bears no relation to real
conditions on the ground"].) As a popular CEQA treatise describes them, EPIC
and similar cases "hold that, in assessing the impacts of a project
proposed for an undeveloped piece of
property, agencies should compare project impacts against the existing
environment, rather than some hypothetical, impacted future environment
that might occur without the project under existing general plan and/or zoning
designations." (Remy et al., Guide to the Cal. Environmental Quality Act (10th ed. 1999) p. 165 (hereafter
Remy).) As in EPIC, the EIR here was legally inadequate as an
informational document because it failed to analyze consistently and coherently
the impacts of the project relative to leaving the land in its existing
physical condition. The
city makes an alternative argument that, even if it did not sufficiently
analyze the project's impacts relative to existing physical conditions, it had
discretion not to do so. The proposition that an agency sometimes can choose a
baseline other than existing physical conditions is implicit in the Guideline's
statement that existing physical conditions are "normally" the
baseline. Even so, in this case, neither the city nor Zinkin has advanced any
reason why the normal approach was not required here. If EPIC represents
the normal situation--and there is every reason to think it does, since it is
cited as authority for the Guideline in question (see Discussion following
Guidelines, § 15125)--we would need some persuasive reason not to apply EPIC.
The city says EPIC is "inapt" because here the EIR did contain
some references to existing conditions. As we have just seen, the EIR's in EPIC
did also, but that was not enough where the main thrust was a comparison of the
proposed project with hypothetical conditions that were allowed under the existing
general plan. The
city cites Fat v. County of Sacramento (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1270 [119 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 402], but that case does not present an analogous situation.
There, the question was whether an agency that did use existing physical
conditions as the environmental baseline in an EIR was required not to
do so because those conditions resulted from previous illegal construction. The
Court of Appeal held that the agency acted within its discretion in using
existing physical conditions as the baseline. (Id. at p. 1278.) Situations
appearing in the case law that were treated as not "normal" are not
comparable to the present case. (Black Property Owners Assn. v. City of
Berkeley (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 974, 985-986 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 305] [EIR
reviewing update of housing element of general plan, not involving approval of
any specific construction, could take preexisting policies readopted without
change as part of baseline]; Benton v. Board of Supervisors (1991) 226 Cal.
App. 3d 1467, 1477, fn. 10 [277 Cal. Rptr. 481] [supplemental EIR prepared
because of changes in previously reviewed and approved project could use
project as approved in original EIR as environmental baseline].) There was no
reason here why the usual rule requiring the baseline to be the existing physical
environment would not apply. The city and Zinkin finally claim that the EIR
did not have to use existing physical conditions as the baseline because
previous environmental review of the property for other purposes "analyzed
impacts to the site 'from the dirt up.' " Previous review mentioned by the
city and Zinkin includes the 1990 rezoning and plan amendments and an EIR prepared
for the 1989 Woodward Park Community Plan. We do not see how environmental
review occurring years before the present project was conceived affects the
question of what the baseline should have been in the EIR for the present
project. The suggestion appears to be that members of the public could (1)
retrieve the environmental documents prepared on those earlier occasions, (2)
locate analyses that evaluated impacts by comparing the vacant land with whatever
plans or projects those earlier processes approved, and then (3) add those
impacts to the impacts identified in the present EIR. The sum of the earlier
dentified impacts and those identified
now would be the actual impacts of the present project based on a comparison
with vacant land. Even assuming this would have been possible, an agency cannot
satisfy its CEQA obligations by imposing a burden of that kind on the public. The
notion that it could is unsupported by authority and inconsistent with the
axiom that an EIR's basic purpose is to inform. It is significant, also, that
the city and Zinkin do not even claim that there is a prior EIR for a
project on this property. The Woodward Park Community Plan EIR pertained
to a community plan, not a specific construction project. There is no
indication in the record that any EIR was certified for the 1990 rezoning and
plan amendments. The EIR here failed to use the existing physical environment
as the environmental baseline, and none of the city's or Zinkin's arguments
show that any other baseline was permissible. 3. Exhaustion and preservation The
city and Zinkin argue that the baseline issue was never raised in the agency
proceedings or in the trial court, so Woodward Park has not exhausted
its administrative remedies and the issue is not preserved for appeal. We
disagree. Exhaustion of administrative remedies Before
a petitioner can assert a CEQA violation against an agency in court,
someone--not necessarily the petitioner--must raise the same issue before the
agency in the administrative proceedings. (§ 21177, subd. (a).) The
petitioner itself need only have raised some objection before the agency
(§ 21177, subd. (b)); if it has, it may then litigate any issue raised
before the agency by anyone. The claimed violation and the evidence on which it
is based must have been raised by
someone in the administrative forum. (Barthelemy v. Chino Basin Mun. Water
Dist. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1609, 1620-1621 [45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 688].) Even
so, "less specificity is required to preserve an issue for appeal in an
administrative proceeding than in a judicial proceeding," since citizens
are not expected to bring legal expertise to the administrative proceeding. (Citizens
Assn. for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo (1985) 172 Cal.
App. 3d 151, 163 [217 Cal. Rptr. 893].) Where there was no public hearing
or other opportunity for the public to raise objections, the exhaustion
requirement does not apply at all. (§ 21177, subd. (e).) The purpose of
the exhaustion doctrine is to give the agency an opportunity to respond to
specific objections before those objections are subjected to judicial review. (Park
Area Neighbors v. Town of Fairfax (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1442, 1449 [35 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 334].) The
baseline issue was fairly raised by the comment letter submitted by Caltrans in
response to the notice of preparation. The letter stated: "Using a full
buildout residential development as a 'no build' scenario is also inaccurate.
In order to be accurate for this Air Quality Impact Assessment, the 'no build'
scenario should reflect current conditions (vacant lot) should the property not
be developed, compare to buildout of
current zoning with residential and then finally compare to buildout with mixed
use development." The writer should have referred to a full buildout office
development instead of a residential one, but other than that, his comment
captures the essence of this issue. The same letter made the point that the
city should not refuse to mitigate freeway traffic impacts on the ground that
buildout under existing zoning would cause more peak-hour trips because that was
not the relevant point of comparison.
This also raised the substance of the baseline issue. Petitioners'
administrative remedies were exhausted on this issue. Preservation of issue for appeal As a
general rule, an appellate court will not review an issue that was not raised
by some proper method by a party in the trial court. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure
(4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 394, p. 444.) It is important to remember, however,
that the purpose of this general rule is to give the trial court and parties an
opportunity to correct an error that could be corrected by some means
short of an opposite outcome in the trial court. A "noncurable defect of
substance where the question is one of law" is not an error that falls
within the rule. A "matter involving the public interest or the due administration
of justice" also is not. (Id. at p. 450.) Here, the baseline issue
we have just discussed falls within both of these exceptions. United
California Bank v. Bottler (1971) 16 Cal. App. 3d 610 [94 Cal. Rptr. 227] illustrates the point. The trial court
there entered an order directing that if a testator's daughter should have no
living descendants at the time of her death, the remainder of the assets devised
to her in trust by the testator (her father) pursuant to a power of appointment
would be distributed to the heirs of her grandfather, who originally created
the power of appointment. (Id. at pp. 613-615.) Holding that this result
violated the rule against perpetuities, the Court of Appeal reversed. (Id.
at pp. 616-618.) It did not matter that no party raised the perpetuities
issue in the trial court: "It does not appear that the perpetuities problem
was ever brought to the attention of the trial court. Appellant raises it for
the first time in her brief in this court. Since the rule [against
perpetuities] is based upon public policy rather than private convenience, we
cannot invoke any doctrine of waiver, but must face the issue and apply the
limitation which the law imposes." (United California Bank v. Bottler,
supra, 16 Cal. App. 3d at p. 616.) The
Court of Appeal in Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of Supervisors (1971) 20 Cal.
App. 3d 1 [97 Cal. Rptr. 431] (Bayside) made a similar point. The
trial court issued a writ of mandate compelling a county to issue a permit to a
timber company to grade a logging road. It ruled that a state law, the
Z'berg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act of 1973 (Pub. Resources Code, § 4511 et
seq.), preempted local regulation. (Bayside, supra, at pp. 3-4.) The
Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the Forest Practice Act violated the
state and federal Constitutions. (Bayside, supra, at p. 14.) The constitutional
issue was raised for the first time on appeal. The court considered and ruled
on the merits of the issue anyway, observing that issues raised for the first
time on appeal are often considered if they relate to questions of law only,
especially "where the public interest or public policy is involved."
(Id. at p. 5.) The court concluded that regulation of the logging
industry was of great interest to the public, so the case was within the
exception for pure questions of law relating to the public interest. (Id. at
p. 6.) There
are many other examples. (See, e.g., Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388,
394 [149 Cal. Rptr. 375, 584 P.2d 512] [constitutional issue of great
public interest raised for first time on appeal]; Bonner v. City of Santa
Ana (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1476 [53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671] [recoverability
of money damages for violations of state due process and equal
protection clauses raised for first time on appeal], overruled on other grounds by Katzberg v.
Regents of University of California (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300, 320 [127 Cal. Rptr.
2d 482, 58 P.3d 339]; In re Marriage of Weaver (1990) 224 Cal. App. 3d
478, 488 [273 Cal. Rptr. 696] [clear-and-convincing-evidence standard must
be applied to claim of transmutation from separate to community property; issue raised for first time on appeal].) We conclude that the issue we are now
considering falls within the exceptions. The question is whether the environmental
documents were adequate as a matter of law. This is, of course, a question of
law. It is also an error the trial court could not have cured. The defects in
the environmental documents were fixed and there was nothing the court or
parties could do about them. If Woodward Park had advanced this issue in
a more detailed way, the trial court could have responded correctly only by
granting the writ. Further, the determination of whether the agency has
complied with CEQA before approving a major development project in a densely
populated area is an issue of public interest. To refuse to entertain this
issue would not advance the purposes of the preservation doctrine. The
parties' failure to raise the issue in their original appellate briefs does not
bar our consideration of it if the parties have had a fair opportunity to
present their positions. (See Wong v. Di Grazia (1963) 60 Cal.2d 525, 532,
fn. 9 [35 Cal. Rptr. 241, 386 P.2d 817] [parties missed
rule-against-perpetuities issue in their briefs but Court of Appeal raised it
at oral argument; "the issue ... [is of] considerable public interest; it
has been fully argued before this court [i.e., the Supreme Court]; we, accordingly,
dispose of the issue on its merits"].) This issue was raised in our
briefing letter and the parties submitted supplemental briefs addressing it. In
sum, the issue is an appropriate one to address on appeal. B. No-project alternative The no-project
alternative employed in the EIR presents a similar question. In circumstances
like these, the no-project alternative should discuss both the existing
physical conditions and likely future conditions under the existing zoning and
plan designations, and the city argues that this is just what happened. In
reality, the EIR's no-project discussion mentioned the property's vacant status
briefly and then focused all its analysis on the maximum allowable project
under existing designations. If the EIR's impact analyses had been based on the
correct baseline--existing physical conditions--we might conclude that
the city acted within its discretion in minimizing the examination of existing
physical conditions in the no-project discussion, since a comparison of
the project with existing physical conditions would already be in the document.
As we have just explained, the EIR did not use existing physical conditions as
the baseline. This being so, we conclude that the no-project discussion was
inadequate as a matter of law because it considered buildout under existing
designations almost to the exclusion of existing physical conditions. 1.
Applicable law The
Guidelines set out the dual character of the no-project alternative in
situations where some other future development is likely under existing
designations if the present project is disapproved: "The 'no project'
analysis shall discuss the existing conditions at the time the notice of
preparation is published ... as well as what would be reasonably expected to
occur in the foreseeable future if the project were not approved, based on current plans and consistent with
available infrastructure and community services." (Guidelines, §
15126.6, subd. (e)(2).) More pointedly, where the project is "a
development project on identifiable property," the following applies:
"[T]he 'no project' alternative is the circumstance under which the
project does not proceed. Here the
discussion would compare the environmental effects of the property remaining in
its existing state against environmental effects which would occur if the
project is approved. If disapproval of the project under consideration would
result in predictable actions by others, such as the proposal of some other
project, this 'no project' consequence should be discussed. In certain
instances, the no project alternative means 'no build' wherein the existing environmental
setting is maintained. However, where failure to proceed with the project will
not result in preservation of existing environmental conditions, the analysis
should identify the practical result of the project's non-approval and not
create and analyze a set of artificial assumptions that would be required to
preserve the existing physical environment." (Guidelines, § 15126.6,
subd. (e)(3)(B).) The Guidelines state that the no-project alternative is
not necessarily the same as the environmental baseline. (Guidelines, §
15126.6, subd. (e)(1).) Environmental
treatise writers have recognized that, as a practical matter, these provisions
mean the no-project discussion will often be primarily devoted to comparing the
proposed project to a project that could be built under existing zoning and
plan designations even though the baseline is existing physical conditions. The
Guidelines have repudiated "the proposition that the analysis of the 'no
project' alternative in an EIR 'must describe maintenance of the existing environment
as a basis for comparison of the suggested alternatives to the status quo.'
" (Remy, supra, at p. 169.) One treatise even suggests that when a
project is a plan revision, the labor should simply be divided between the
baseline-impacts discussion and the no-project discussion. The baseline-impacts
discussion should be based on existing physical conditions and the no-project
discussion on hypothetical buildout under the existing plan. "[W]hen a
project consists of the revision of a plan or policy, the project's impacts are
assessed against [a baseline of] existing conditions, and future conditions
under the existing plan are treated as a 'no-project' alternative." (1
Kostka & Zischke, Practice Under the Cal. Environmental Quality Act
(Cont.Ed.Bar 2006) § 13.12, p. 638.)
2. Analysis: failure to address existing conditions adequately
anywhere in the EIR Here,
the agency chose to push the envelope in both discussions, shoving existing
physical conditions to the margin in both its measurement of impacts against a
baseline and its consideration of the no-project alternative. Although a
no-project discussion heavily dominated by consideration of buildout under
existing designations might have been proper in an EIR where the baseline was
existing physical conditions, that was not the baseline used here. The
Guidelines on the no-project alternative do require attention to existing
physical conditions "as well as" to hypothetical future developments
under existing plans. (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (e)(2).) Due to the
fact this attention was not adequately paid anywhere in the EIR, we
cannot say the no-project discussion was legally adequate. 3. Exhaustion and preservation The
city and Zinkin argue that Woodward Park failed to exhaust
administrative remedies with respect to this issue and that it has not been
preserved for appeal. Again, we disagree. Exhaustion of administrative remedies Administrative remedies were exhausted on this
issue. As our discussion has shown, the question is closely related to the
environmental baseline. The comment letter from Caltrans--saying that
"[u]sing a full build-out ... development as a 'no build' scenario is ...
inaccurate"--was sufficient to raise both issues before the city council.
Further, it is apparent from the final EIR that the city took this letter as
showing potential difficulties with the EIR's no-project definition. The final
EIR added this clarification to its no-project discussion: "The
No Project alternative is considered office development according to existing
zoning. CEQA Guidelines Section 15126.6 [(e)](3)(B) stipulates that if
the proposed project is a development project on identifiable property, the 'no
project' alternative will be the circumstance under which the project does not
proceed. This section, however, also stipulates that where failure to proceed
with the project will not result in preservation of the existing environment
(i.e., vacant property) the analysis should identify the practical result of
the project's non-approval. "The
project site is vacant and by-passed and has long been planned and zoned for
office use. If the proposed project is denied, it is unlikely that the site
will remain in its vacant condition and the future development of the site will occur. As a result, the analysis in the
[draft EIR] for the No Project Alternative is consistent with CEQA
provisions." This analysis is not correct for the reasons we have
explained, but it does show that the city knew of objections and had an
opportunity to correct the problem. Preservation of issue for appeal The
question of whether the EIR included a correct no-project analysis was a
question of law, and the legal adequacy of the EIR unquestionably raises a
matter of public interest. This means, for the reasons we discussed earlier,
that it is appropriate to address the issue now even though it was raised for
the first time on appeal. The parties were given an opportunity to file, and
did file, supplemental briefs on the issue. Consequently, it is appropriate to
consider the merits. C. Statement of overriding
considerations 1. Applicable law An
agency must adopt a statement of overriding considerations when it approves a
project in spite of significant, unavoidable environmental impacts that cannot
be sufficiently mitigated. (§ 21081, subd. (b); Guidelines, § 15093.)
Overriding considerations contrast with mitigation and feasibility findings.
They are "larger, more general reasons for approving the project, such as
the need to create new jobs, provide housing, generate taxes, and the like."
(Concerned Citizens of South Central L.A. v. Los Angeles Unified School
Dist. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 826, 847 [29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492].) This does not
mean, however, that an agency's unsupported claim that the project will confer
general benefits is sufficient. The asserted overriding considerations must be
supported by substantial evidence in the final EIR or somewhere in the record.
(Sierra Club v. Contra Costa County (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1223 [13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182]; Guidelines, §
15093, subd. (b).) 2. Analysis: misrepresentation of
project alternatives A statement of overriding considerations is
similar to findings in an EIR in that it needs to be supported by substantial
evidence in the record. An EIR is also required to make a " 'good-faith
effort' " to disclose the environmental impacts of a project to decision
makers and the public. (Berkeley Keep Jets Over the Bay Com. v. Board of
Port Cmrs. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1355 [111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 598]; see
Guidelines, § 15151.) An EIR vindicates the "right of the public to
be informed in such a way that it can intelligently weigh the environmental
consequences" of a proposed project (Karlson v. City of Camarillo
(1980) 100 Cal. App. 3d 789, 804 [161 Cal. Rptr. 260]). Further, an appellate court is required to determine
the EIR's "sufficiency as an informative document." (County of
Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 71 Cal. App. 3d 185, 189 [139 Cal. Rptr.
396].) We
believe a statement of overriding considerations, like an EIR, must make a good
faith effort to inform the public. In Sierra Club v. Contra Costa County,
supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at page 1223, the court acknowledged that a statement
of overriding considerations represents an agency's policy decision, but
concluded that it still must have a foundation in the record. Likewise, the
statement's status as a policy judgment does not insulate it from CEQA's
central demand that environmental decisions be made after the public and
decision makers have been informed of their consequences and the reasons for
and against them. The statement's purposes are undermined if its conclusions
are based on misrepresentations of the contents of the EIR or it misleads the
reader about the relative magnitude of the impacts and benefits the agency has
considered. The
statement of overriding considerations adopted in this case was inadequate for
these types of reasons. The EIR described the project alternatives as
developments that were as large as, or larger than, the proposed project. To
the contrary, the statement of overriding considerations said the proposed
project had superior economic benefits because the alternatives "generally
propose no development or development to a lesser degree" and
"primarily provide for developments of a reduced intensity or no development."
Having minimized the appearance of the proposed project's impacts by packing
the EIR with intensive project alternatives whose environmental advantages were
few, the city was confronted with the other side of the coin. These large
alternatives likely would have economic benefits of comparable magnitude to the
proposed project and the balance would be close. In effect, by inaccurately
describing the project alternatives as "no development or development to a
lesser degree," the statement applied a thumb to the scale. The
inevitable effect of describing the alternatives as intensive developments in
the EIR and then characterizing them as smaller or nonexistent developments in
the statement of overriding considerations was to mislead the public and decision
makers about the project's advantages and disadvantages. The end result is that
the statement did not serve its mandated purpose as an informational
document. In
reality, the primary difference between the proposed project and the project
alternatives described in the EIR was that the proposed project had a shopping
center while the alternatives had no shopping center or a smaller one. The alternatives
more than made up the resulting difference
in square footage by adding more office and office-related retail space.
If the statement of overriding
considerations had said accurately that the alternatives proposed "no
shopping center or a smaller shopping center" instead of inaccurately
"no development or development to a lesser degree," it would have
made a far different impression on the public. We do not have to look far to
find a reason why the city might not have wanted to use the accurate language
since many project opponents, especially neighbors, concentrated their fire on
the shopping center component of the project. In
addition, the city's claim of superior economic benefits was not supported by
substantial evidence in the record. Nothing in the EIR or in the record
supports the claim that the project would generate more economic activity than
the equally large project alternatives. The
city has anticipated the possibility that one of its claimed overriding
considerations could be struck down by asserting the sufficiency of each
standing alone. The statement of overriding considerations says "the
benefits identified below are each one, in and of themselves, sufficient to
make a determination that the adverse environmental effects are
acceptable." The statement's other claim is that the proposed project will
provide a greater variety of economic activity--not just a greater
quantity. "The other alternatives would offer a lesser variety of
employment opportunities, less available services for the community and less
available housing"; "[t]he benefits of providing a mixed use
development with a diverse variety of office uses together with commercial
goods and services and residential uses within a given neighborhood would be
reduced with any of the proposed alternatives"; the alternatives would
provide "a lesser range of employment opportunities ... ." For
starters, the claim about housing is not supported by sufficient evidence. The
city admits that the 20 apartments in the proposal are speculative--only a
"place-holder"--and that one of the project alternatives proposed far
more apartments (135). We
will leave that claim aside and focus on what remains of the statement's
finding about variety of economic activity. Stripping away the excess verbiage,
this finding is that some of the economic benefits of the proposed project
would arise from retail goods and retail jobs at the shopping center, while the
economic benefits of the alternatives would arise from other activities. This
leads to the question of whether substantial evidence in the record supported
the idea that a development with offices and a shopping center necessarily has
a greater variety of economic activity than a development with offices and
office-related retail space. We need not answer that question, however. If the
essential claim of the statement of overriding considerations was that a
development with a shopping center is economically better for the community
than any feasible alternative development of comparable size, the statement was
fundamentally misleading. Any claim
about the special economic virtues of shopping centers was buried in
obfuscatory language, such as "[t]he benefits of providing a mixed use
development with a diverse variety of office uses together with commercial
goods and services and residential uses within a given neighborhood would be
reduced with any of the proposed alternatives." In sum, if the basis of
the decision was something special about shopping centers, the statement effectively
concealed that basis from the reader. "There is a sort of grand design in
CEQA: Projects which significantly affect the environment can go
forward, but only after the elected
decision makers have their noses rubbed in those environmental effects, and
vote to go forward anyway." (Vedanta Society of So. California v.
California Quartet, Ltd. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 517, 530 [100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 889].)
The statement of overriding considerations does not even come close to rubbing
anyone's nose in the facts. Although we agree with the contention of the city
and Zinkin that the statement was not required to contain a quantitative fiscal
analysis of the economic costs and benefits of the project, it still must contain
a weighing and balancing analysis not dependent on assumptions contradicted by
the EIR. 3. Exhaustion and preservation We are
satisfied that Woodward Park exhausted its administrative remedies with
respect to the statement of overriding considerations and that it is
appropriate to reach the merits of this issue on appeal. Exhaustion of administrative remedies There
is no evidence in the record that the statement of overriding considerations
was made available to the public before the day of the city council meeting at
which it was adopted. No draft statement is attached to the draft EIR's that
were distributed to the public earlier in the process. At least two of the comment
letters stated that there were no overriding considerations mentioned in the
final circulated version of the EIR. As far as we can tell from the record, the
public had only the day of the meeting to review and analyze the statement.
Under these circumstances, it is uncertain whether the exhaustion requirement
even applies to objections to the statement of overriding considerations.
Assuming it does, where the agency's own action severely limited the public's
opportunity to review and analyze the document, it would be antithetical to the
purposes of CEQA to require the public to articulate precise factual and legal
objections to the statement as a precondition to litigating those issues. A
more general enunciation of issues related to the statement, sufficient to put
the agency on notice that the document may not satisfy legal requirements, is
adequate to exhaust administrative remedies. In
light of this, the objections that were raised to the statement of overriding
considerations at the city council meeting were sufficient. Woodward Park's attorney observed that
"the most significant thing in your overriding considerations is that you
make a finding or purport to make a finding in your resolution that you've
weighed and balanced the detriments caused by the environmental impact which
are acknowledged as unavoidable and significant air quality and traffic
congestion." A discussion during the meeting between Councilmember
Boyajian and Planning Manager Haro explored the merits and demerits of the
statement in some detail, however: "Boyajian
What's basically the overriding consideration, why we need a new, another
shopping center in this area based on the fact that we don't, that we haven't
really complied and we can't mitigate the environmental impact? "Haro
Attached to your staff report Mr. Boyajian is Exhibit B, it's attached to the
Resolution Certifying the Final EIR No. 10129. In Exhibit B you will find the
Statement of Overriding Considerations for findings of significant and
unavoidable impacts. The first listed finding related to this issue of Caltrans
is called Transportation and Circulation. What those findings do is say they
are overriding social and economic considerations and uh, that need to be
considered in order to approve the project to override ... "Boyajian What does that, what does that
mean, I don't understand the general ... "Haro
What that means is and if you look at the details and I'll summarize them for
you ... "Boyajian
Yeah summarize them please. "Haro
Summarize them for you? One of the overriding considerations, the same thing
we've done for Armenian Town EIR, for the master EIR, for the general plan, is
the economic job creation situation of this valley. That is an overriding
consideration, legally acceptable under the CEQA guidelines. "Boyajian
Ok the development's going to cause jobs? "Haro
Development crea--land development creates jobs, that's correct. "Boyajian Ok. "Haro
And the other overriding consideration that's really important in this case is
that this project is not generating by the controls we've placed on them, any
more traffic than is as it stands now and as it was approved in 1990. "Boyajian
Ok. "Haro
12,400 vehicle trips per day. That is a finding of fact that we've included in
there. "Boyajian
Ok. So basically those are the two overriding considerations. "Haro
Those are the two major overriding considerations, that's correct." Two things are significant about this
conversation. First, it included a decision maker's skeptical questions about
whether the statement coherently set forth the ultimate justifications for the
project. This shows that the agency was made aware of potential problems in the
statement at that fundamental level. Second,
the city staff member's response to the questions misrepresented the contents
of the statement. The statement does not say the trip-generation estimate for
the project (and a comparison of it with the trip cap previously approved) is
an overriding consideration. Logically, it could not make that statement. The
trip-generation estimate is a measurement of an environmental impact (or the
lack of one) from the project. Overriding considerations are, by definition,
not impacts or the lack of impacts. They are reasons for proceeding with a
project despite impacts. What is more, the staff member's comment was very
misleading in light of what the statement did, in reality, say about traffic:
that the project would have a significant unavoidable adverse impact on traffic
congestion in spite of the mitigating measures the city would be requiring. The
city staff member's comments reinforce our view that members of the public did
all that was necessary to exhaust administrative remedies. The statement not
only was presented to the public at the last possible moment--the same day the
decision was made--but a city staff member undermined public efforts to
understand the document in the short time available by misstating its contents
at the meeting. This is even less understandable since it was city staff who prepared
the statement. For
all these reasons, we conclude that administrative remedies were exhausted.
Since the statement of overriding considerations was made available only a
short time before the city council's vote, and because city staff's
presentation of its contents at the meeting was misleading, the brief comments
made about the statement at the meeting by members of the public and the
council were enough to put the agency on notice. The purposes of the exhaustion
doctrine--to allow an agency,
sufficiently notified of objections by
an adequately notified public, to cope with those objections before
litigation can occur--were served as well as they could be under the
circumstances. Preservation of statement-of-overriding-considerations
issue for appeal The
issue of the adequacy of the statement of overriding considerations was not
raised for the first time on appeal. Woodward Park challenged the
statement in its fifth cause of action and the trial court ruled on that claim.
Arguably, the issue raised by Woodward Park was not the same as the
issue we have just discussed. In any event, we do not have to decide whether
the relationship is close enough. The statement-of-overriding-considerations
issue is as much a matter of law and of public interest as the EIR issues we
discussed earlier. Addressing it even if raised for the first time on appeal is
appropriate. II. Treatment of specific
environmental issues In
addition to the fundamental flaws in the environmental documents just
discussed, the EIR's treatment of other environmental issues requires
examination in this case. A. Traffic: "The Caltrans Freeway
Mitigation Controversy" Perhaps
the oddest component of this case is the issue Zinkin dubs the "Caltrans
Freeway Mitigation Controversy." Continuing a long-standing practice, the
city took the position during the CEQA review process that it need not require
any form of mitigation for the project's impacts on freeway traffic--not
because no impacts were identified, or the impacts were not significant, or
mitigation was not feasible, but because the city has been dissatisfied with
the performance of Caltrans in providing information and considers itself free
to refuse to require mitigation so long as its dissatisfaction continues.
Though the record shows that this has been a subject of vigorous debate over
the years among the city, Caltrans, and opponents of development projects, the
fundamental legal question it presents is not difficult. The city must require
feasible mitigation measures for significant freeway traffic impacts, just as
it must for other significant impacts. At the
last minute, the city decided to accept the developer's offer to pay
voluntarily a small sum as a freeway impact mitigation fee; some confusing language
regarding this payment was incorporated into the city council's resolution
certifying the EIR. Because the amount
was based on a calculation that ignored the most costly aspect of the project's
freeway impact, the amount was not supported by substantial evidence. For this
reason, the fee was not an adequate
mitigation measure under CEQA even assuming the language in the resolution
constituted an enforceable mitigation measure. 1. Applicable law An EIR
must "identify and focus on" those environmental impacts of the
project that it finds to be significant. (Guidelines, § 15126.2, subd. (a).)
If the agency has determined that possible impacts are actually not
significant, the EIR must make a finding to that effect. (Guidelines, §
15128.) The EIR also must describe feasible measures that could minimize
significant impacts. (Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1).) If more than
one mitigation measure is available, the EIR must discuss each and describe
reasons for the measure or measures it selects. (Guidelines, § 15126.4,
subd. (a)(1)(B).) If no mitigation measures are feasible, the EIR must say so. (Guidelines, § 15091, subd. (a)(3).)
An EIR can find that the feasible measures available to avoid or mitigate a
significant impact are within the jurisdiction of another agency which has
adopted them or can and should adopt them. (Guidelines, § 15091, subd.
(a)(2).) In any event, the EIR's findings must be supported by substantial
evidence. (§ 21081.5.) In
sum, an agency is forbidden to approve a project unless it finds there are no
significant impacts; or imposes mitigation measures for all significant
impacts; or finds mitigation measures infeasible or within the jurisdiction of
another agency. (§ 21081, subd. (a); Guidelines, § 15091, subd. (a).)
If the EIR finds that there are significant impacts for which no mitigation
measures are feasible, it must adopt a statement of overriding considerations
before approving the project. (§ 21081, subd. (b); Guidelines, §
15093.) There
are two things an agency cannot do: It cannot acknowledge a significant impact,
refuse to do or find anything else about it, and approve the project
anyway. And it cannot acknowledge a
significant impact and approve the project after imposing a mitigation measure
not shown to be adequate by substantial evidence. 2. Analysis: the city's practice
regarding mitigation of traffic impacts The draft EIR dated July 2004 included a table
that "identifie[d] the PM peak hour trips generated by the project that
will impact various segments of the SR 41 mainline and interchanges at Friant
and Herndon Avenues and the resulting fair share fee estimate by improvement.
Caltrans identified the cost per peak hour trip in its comment letter dated
June 1, 2004. The PM peak hour was used since more project trips affect SR 41
segments in the PM peak than trips
generated during the AM peak. AM and PM peak hour project-related trips were
estimated using the Fresno COG [Council of Governments] Regional Traffic
Model." The table showed a total fair share estimate of $31,155. The
draft EIR then refused to require this or any other amount as mitigation on the
ground that Caltrans had not provided information the city wanted. "It is
noted that Caltrans did not provide a source document or 'nexus study' for the
cost per trip by improvement or segment along SR 41 identified in [the table].
In the absence of such documentation by Caltrans, such fees have not been
required as mitigation or conditions of approval by the City of Fresno."
The term "nexus study" refers to a constitutional requirement
described in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n (1987) 483 U.S. 825 [97 L.
Ed. 2d 677, 107 S. Ct. 3141]. As detailed in the Guidelines, this is the requirement
that there "be an essential nexus (i.e. connection) between the mitigation
measure and a legitimate governmental interest." (Guidelines, §
15126.4, subd. (a)(4)(A).) The Guidelines also require that mitigation
measures be "'roughly proportional'" to impacts, as required by Dolan
v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374 [129 L. Ed. 2d 304, 114 S. Ct. 2309].
(Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(4)(B).) As an
alternative reason for requiring no mitigation, the draft EIR stated that the
project would generate less traffic at peak hours than buildout under existing
zoning: "Finally, the proposed project is expected to generate fewer AM or
PM peak hour trips than allowed under current zoning estimated to be 489,000
square feet of general office development and 163,000 square feet of
office-related commercial development (see Section 3.1, Alternatives to the
Proposed Project). Current zoning is expected to generate 931 AM peak hour
trips and 1,338 [PM] peak hour trips. The
project will generate 651 AM peak hour trips and 1,278 PM peak hour trips.
Because the proposed project will generate fewer trips during the congested
peak hours than existing zoning, the assessment of fees to address
project-related impacts along SR 41 may not be appropriate. The City, however,
does not object to the developer voluntarily paying the requested Caltrans
fee." 5 5 This discussion confused the no-project
alternative--the one meant to reflect buildout under existing zoning--with the
Planned Office Development alternative. The square footage and peak-hour
traffic figures the EIR cites here are the same as those set forth for the
Planned Office Development alternative in the EIR's section on alternatives. It
was nowhere claimed in the EIR that the Planned Office Development was compatible
with existing zoning, so the claim that the proposed project had no freeway
impact because the Planned Office Development's peak-hour impact was greater
makes no sense. Absent this confusion--i.e., if the EIR had compared the proposed
project with the no-project alternative, representing existing zoning--it is
unlikely that the proposed project could be claimed to have less peak-hour
freeway traffic. The no-project alternative generated half as many total trips
as the proposed project, so a peak-hour spike exceeding that of the proposed
project is improbable. All this means that, in addition to the difficulties
discussed in the text above, the claim that the proposed project had a smaller
peak-hour impact than existing zoning was unsupported by evidence. A Caltrans district 6 official named Moses
Stites filed a comment letter dated August 27, 2004, in response to the draft
EIR. The letter explained that "[v]arious improvements such as auxiliary
lanes and additional ramp lanes are currently planned" for the State Route
41 interchange at Friant Road, and that the impact mitigation fees Caltrans was
proposing were the project's fair share of the costs of those improvements. The
total projected cost of these improvements is not reflected in the record, but
a later letter from Caltrans put the cost of one component of them, a
southbound auxiliary lane between the Friant and Herndon exits, at $11,640,000. Stites's
August 27 letter disputed the draft EIR's grounds for refusing to require
mitigation. It asserted that basic CEQA principles barred the city from simply
declining to require mitigation of an acknowledged impact: "Mitigation
measures for a project's impacts must be included in an EIR. This determines if
a project's impacts can be eliminated or reduced to a level of insignificance.
Eliminating or reducing impacts to a level of insignificance is the standard
pursuant to CEQA. The lead agency, in this case the City of Fresno, is responsible for administering the CEQA
review process and has the principal authority for approving a local
development proposal or land use change. Based on this, it is our understanding
that it is the City's responsibility under CEQA to conduct any necessary
nexus study via the environmental process." The
letter also contended that comparing project-generated traffic with traffic
that would be generated by a project allowable under existing zoning was not a
correct way to measure the project's impact. "Please note that at the time
the project site was zoned to its current zoning (1990), mitigation for impacts
to the State Highway System was not provided. Therefore, generating fewer trips
with this rezone is not relevant. The project is responsible for mitigating ...
its identified impacts." The
letter disputed the EIR's conclusion about the correct fee amount. In a table
similar to the one in the draft EIR, it showed that the project's fair share
was $445,817. The bulk of the difference was
for project-generated trips using the proposed southbound auxiliary lane
between the Friant and Herndon exists. The proposed mitigation fee for this improvement
was $401,920 (157 trips at $2,560 per trip). The
final EIR, dated September 2004, responded to Caltrans's comments. It continued
to insist that the city was relieved of any obligation to require mitigation because
it was not satisfied with the information provided by Caltrans. "Other responsible agencies
that may be impacted by development such as school and flood control
districts" had provided calculations that met with the city's approbation,
and "Caltrans should not abdicate the responsibility for calculating
development costs and fees to" the city. Further, existing zoning was the
correct baseline even though no mitigation was paid when the city adopted
existing zoning because "the freeway and associated interchanges were not
yet constructed" then. When they were constructed, the state should at its
own cost have designed them to accommodate a builtout landscape in accordance
with then existing zoning. Although
still refusing to require any mitigation, the final EIR included a revised
calculation of what the fee would have been had it been imposed. The adjustment
appears to correct a tabulation error in the draft EIR's table. Where the
original table showed 24 trips on one ramp at $757 per trip and one trip on
another ramp at $1,311 per trip, the revised table showed 24 at $1,311 and one
at $757. The result was an increase in the total to $43,897. The
final EIR continued to show a fee of zero for the southbound auxiliary lane
between Friant and Herndon. The final EIR admitted that the project would have
an impact on that lane, confirming Caltrans's figure of 157 evening peak-hour
trips. These trips "will not use 100% of the proposed auxiliary lane,"
however, so "the project should only be responsible for a portion of the
auxiliary lane ... ." The city would not state a figure for that partial
use because "Caltrans needs to identify the per trip costs and methodology
applied to derive the per trip fee for the various improvements ... before fair
share costs can be assessed to the project." Stites
responded to these comments in a letter dated October 15, 2004. He agreed that
the project should be responsible for only a portion of the 157
project-generated trips on the southbound auxiliary lane from Friant to
Herndon. He revised Caltrans's total fair share estimate downward to $306,558.
In response to the city's request for cost calculations and methodology, Stites
included a detailed explanation of how the figures were derived and attached
several worksheets from Caltrans's traffic engineering office. Stites also
observed that the portion of State Route 41 including the Friant Road interchange
opened in 1989, before the 1990 rezoning, and that it had been designed over a
period of years before that, so Caltrans could not possibly have accommodated
the rezoning, even assuming it had been under some obligation to do so. The
record contains no response by the city to this last letter. Instead, city
staff reported to the planning commission (on Nov. 17, 2004) and the city
council (on Dec. 7, 2004) that the city was not obligated to require any form
of freeway impact mitigation because Caltrans did not provide the right information. Ultimately, city staff came to
the remarkable conclusion that requiring mitigation of freeway traffic impacts
would be illegal: "The City has not recommended that the piecemeal
application of a state facility traffic impact fee be imposed as a condition of
project approval, as it is not evident
that Caltrans has accurately documented a project description and cost, a
reliable estimate of funding sources, a justifiable nexus or connection between
a project and the need for the state facility improvements, and the reasonable
proportionality of the project's share of the improvement costs that are
necessary to justify the imposition of a traffic impact fee for the improvement
of State facilities. This conclusion is based on Caltrans['s] submission of
varying descriptions of the necessary freeway improvements, the imprecise
estimate of costs and probable funding sources, and the lack of adequate information
to comply with Fee Mitigation Act requirements applicable to the City of
Fresno. In the absence of this documentation it is not legally permissible for
the City to impose the requested traffic impact fee." For
his part, Zinkin made clear that he believed there was no obligation to
mitigate the freeway traffic impacts of his project in any way. In a letter to
Caltrans dated October 20, 2004, an attorney representing "the
Owners" of the property and writing on stationery of the Law Offices of
DeWayne Zinkin stated that "the Owners do not believe that they are
required or obligated to pay any fee whatsoever and believe that they are in
fact substantially improving the impact upon the interchange ... ." The
letter blamed a variety of factors "unrelated to new development in the
area" for local freeway traffic problems. It then proposed to settle all
freeway traffic impact mitigation claims for five Zinkin projects in North
Fresno for $100,000. Stites forwarded this letter to the city, stating that he
did not believe it was possible under CEQA to enter into a settlement regarding
impacts of projects for which EIR's had never been prepared and had not been
subject to CEQA review. He also stated that neither the Mitigation Fee Act (Gov.
Code, § 66000 et seq.) nor the concepts of nexus and proportionality
explained in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, supra, 483 U.S. 825
and Dolan v. City of Tigard, supra, 512 U.S. 374 could serve as excuses
for refusing to require any mitigation for an acknowledged significant impact. The
city's stance was pursuant to a long-standing policy of refusing to do this, a
policy based not on any analysis of what CEQA requires but on a disagreement
between the city and Caltrans over what information Caltrans should supply to
the city for use in calculating impact fees. Letters in the record and comments
in the final EIR reflect action by the city on this basis going back at least
as far at 1998. Simply
stated: The city's practice is illegal. There is no foundation for the idea
that the city can refuse to require mitigation of an impact solely because another agency did not provide information.
The seed of the city's confusion, as evidenced in the city staff report to the
planning commission and city council, is its belief that the city needs to
require mitigation of this category of impacts only if Caltrans proposes a
mitigation measure and then proves to the city's satisfaction that the measure
is legal. This is not how CEQA works. When the city identifies an impact of a
project, CEQA gives it only four choices: (1) to find, based on substantial evidence,
that the impact is insignificant; (2) to find, based on substantial evidence,
that although the impact is significant, no mitigation is feasible and the
project is justified by overriding considerations in spite of this; (3) to
require a mitigation measure and find, based on substantial evidence, that the
mitigation measure renders the impact insignificant; or (4) to find that
mitigation measures are within another agency's responsibility and that the
other agency has adopted them or can and
should do so. Caltrans's behavior does not create a fifth option. At the
very end of the CEQA process, during the city council meeting at which the
project was approved, the city consented to accept the developer's last-minute
offer to pay a freeway impact fee voluntarily.
During the city council's meeting, Zinkin's attorney stood up and proposed
"in a spirit of compromise" that the council impose a freeway traffic
impact mitigation fee of $45,000. When Councilmember Duncan made his motion to
certify the EIR and approve the project, he proposed a modification to
"accept the $45,000 ... for Caltrans ... ." The city attorney asked
for "clarification," inquiring whether "[t]he $45,000 voluntary
mitigation fee, that would be something that would be added to the resolution
adopting and certifying the final EIR." No clarification came. The $45,000
offer was mentioned again later and Councilmember Duncan's motion to approve
the project was eventually seconded and carried. The
following language appears in the written resolution the council ultimately
executed certifying the EIR: "Upon
approval of the required 'master' conditional use permit/site plan, the
developer shall deposit with the City of Fresno the project's fair share
estimate for required improvements to the State Route 41 and related interchange
with Friant Road as determined by [the city's traffic consultant] and as
depicted on Page 4-6 of the Final EIR dated September 2004 in the amount of
$43,897.00." The reason for the slight reduction in amount compared with
the offer made by the developer's counsel at the meeting does not appear in the
record. The details of the measure--such
as the provision that the money be "deposit[ed] with the City" rather
than simply paid to Caltrans--were never subjected to public scrutiny, since
they were not mentioned by anyone at the meeting and the EIR was never
recirculated after the meeting. It is
also potentially significant that the $43,897 payment is not structured as a
condition on site-plan approval and use-permit issuance. As written in
the council's resolution, the measure operates the other way around:
Plan approval and permit issuance are conditions that the city must satisfy
before Zinkin is required to make payment.
Rather than making the city's final approvals depend on payment of the
mitigation measure, the resolution makes the obligation to pay the money (even
as a mere "deposit") depend on the city's first issuing those
approvals. The resolution does not state
that the project would suffer any adverse consequence if, after the master
conditional use permit is issued and the site plan is approved, the
"deposit" should go unpaid.
The resolution's statement that the developer "shall deposit"
the money cannot be construed as Zinkin's contractually enforceable promise to
pay, since the resolution is not a contract and Zinkin is not a signatory of
it. The Guidelines state that mitigation
measures must be enforceable.
(Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(2) ["Mitigation measures
must be fully enforceable through permit conditions, agreements, or other
legally-binding instruments"].) It is not obvious that the resolution imposed
on the developer an enforceable obligation to pay any money to Caltrans as a
condition on the project going forward. 6 6 After this court originally issued its
opinion in this case, the city and Zinkin requested that we take judicial
notice of an agreement between Caltrans and something called "Fresno
40." The request is granted. So far
as the record discloses, no corporate entity named "Fresno 40"
exists. No such entity is a party or
real party in interest to this litigation.
We understand this to be merely an informal name by which the vacant
land at issue in this case is commonly known.
DeWayne Zinkin signed the agreement on behalf of "Fresno 40." The
agreement recites that "the City of Fresno conditioned this project to
mitigate for the identified impacts to the State Highway System at the reduced
amount identified in the applicant's Environmental Impact Report, as stated in
[the city council's resolution,] and Caltrans has accepted the conditioned
reduced amount as full mitigation for this project." The agreement also
duplicates the language of the resolution quoted in the text above. This
agreement was executed on May 30, 2006, long after the city council's approval
of the project and long after the trial court's ruling in this case. The city is not a party to the
agreement. The agreement thus does not
constitute a mitigation measure upon which project approval was conditioned. Further, the amount is not supported by
substantial evidence for the reasons stated in this opinion. Finally, Caltrans's agreement that the
statements in the resolution constitute "full mitigation" does not
make it so. Caltrans is not empowered to
determine whether another agency has fulfilled its CEQA duties. In spite of this, we will assume for the sake
of argument that the language in the resolution regarding a deposit constituted
an enforceable obligation. The
mitigation of the impact is still not adequate, however, because the $43,897
figure was not supported by substantial evidence. The city describes the
difference between the final EIR's figure of $43,897 and Caltrans's final figure
of $306,558 as a mere difference of expert opinion; it says the city had
discretion to rely on the EIR figure because substantial evidence supported
that figure even if it also supported another figure. This is not correct. The only
difference between the final EIR figure and the final Caltrans figure is that
the final Caltrans figure includes a portion of the cost associated with project-generated trips that will use the
southbound auxiliary lane between Friant and Herndon Avenues while the final
EIR figure does not. As we have already said, the final EIR admits that
project-generated traffic will have an impact on that lane but sets the
mitigation fee for this impact at zero because of dissatisfaction with
Caltrans's performance in supplying information. In other words, the EIR admits
that its calculation is incomplete--that it leaves out a part of the impact
that could be mitigated--and refuses to supply a complete calculation. This
means the EIR's figure is not supported by substantial evidence. Finally,
as for the argument that the project actually would have no impact on freeway
traffic at all, either because the projected daily trips would fall within the
previously approved trip cap or because the project would generate fewer
peak-hour trips than a builtout project under preexisting zoning, the baseline discussion
earlier in this opinion disposes of this idea. The impact of the project had to
be measured against vacant land, which of course generates zero trips. 3. Exhaustion and preservation There
is no question that administrative remedies have been preserved with respect to
this issue. Caltrans's comment letter dealt with the issue exhaustively. In
addition, Woodward Park likely preserved this issue by litigating its
fifth cause of action, even though it dismissed its first cause of action,
which also addressed the issue. We do not rely on this point, however, because Woodward
Park's dismissal of the first cause of action might reasonably have been
understood as removing all contentions regarding freeway traffic from the trial
court's purview. In fact, that is how the trial court understood it. Due to the exceptions to the preservation
doctrine for pure questions of law and issues of public interest, however, we
need not decide this question. The issue of the city's illegal policy and its
application here were within both exceptions. There is no reason to think a
party's affirmative withdrawal (as opposed to its mere neglect) of an issue in
the trial court trumps the application of the exceptions. B. Air pollution The
EIR's air pollution discussion is inadequate for the reason we have already
discussed: It proceeds from the wrong environmental baseline, assessing the
project's impacts as slight because they are not much greater than the impacts
of a builtout development under preexisting zoning and plan designations. In
addition to this, however, Woodward Park argues that the air pollution
discussion is inadequate for another reason. It states that "there is
no disclosure and analysis whatsoever of
the correlation of 'the identified adverse air quality impacts to resultant
adverse health effects.' " Woodward Park relies on Bakersfield
Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1184
[22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 203] (Bakersfield), in which we addressed the same
issue. In that case, we applied section 15126.2, subdivision (a), of the
Guidelines, which requires EIR's to discuss health and safety problems caused
by a project's physical impacts on the environment. (Bakersfield, supra, at
pp. 1219-1220.) Because
the EIR is inadequate as a matter of law for the other reasons discussed in
this opinion, we need not address this issue. We express no opinion about
whether the EIR's discussion of the health effects of the proposed project's
air pollution impacts satisfied CEQA's requirements. C. General plan consistency: mix of
uses Woodward
Park's claim that
project approval was improper because it resulted in inconsistency in the
general plan is based on the following provision of the Government Code:
"In construing the provisions of this article, the Legislature intends
that the general plan and elements and parts thereof comprise an integrated,
internally consistent and compatible statement of policies for the adopting
agency." (Gov. Code, § 65300.5.) Members of the public may obtain
judicial review of the internal consistency of an agency's general plan; the
court applies the deferential standard of review set forth earlier in this
opinion. The appropriate remedy for inconsistency is a writ of mandate
requiring the agency to take action to render the plan internally consistent. (Gov.
Code, § 65301.5; Murrieta Valley Unified School Dist. v. County of
Riverside (1991) 228 Cal. App. 3d 1212, 1235 [279 Cal. Rptr. 421].) Woodward
Park contends that the city's decision to approve the project, including
the necessary changes to the general plan, rendered that plan inconsistent because
the project included a smaller housing component than the general plan required
for new developments of its kind in the Woodward Park neighborhood. We
agree with the trial court's conclusion that, at the time the city approved the
project, the general plan did not require projects to include any specific
quantity of housing. The general plan included an appendix titled
"Landscape of Choice--Principles and Strategies," prepared by an
organization called Growth Alternatives Alliance. A model ordinance was
allegedly attached to the appendix. 7 This model ordinance, according to the
trial court, "provides that 20 to
50 percent of the built square footage of a mixed use project should be residential."
Woodward Park claims that the model ordinance is binding law because,
when the city council adopted the general plan, it also expressly adopted
" 'all text, policies, maps, tables and exhibits' " contained in the
plan document. Policy C-8-b of the general plan, however, makes it clear that
the model ordinance is only to be used as a source of guidance: "Utilize
the model ordinances contained in the 'Liveable Neighborhood Development' implementation
guideline of October 2001 (prepared by the Growth Alternatives Alliance for 'A
Landscape of Choice') for guidance in preparation of zoning regulations
proposing mixing of residential with nonresidential land uses." (2025
Fresno General Plan (Feb. 1, 2002), ch. 4, p. 38.) 7 The model ordinance is not included in the
administrative record, nor is it part of the copy of the general plan included
in the record. In his opening brief, Woodward Park's counsel claims he
distributed copies of the ordinance at the city council meeting but admits it
is not in the record on appeal. The copy of the general plan posted on the
city's public Web site (of which we take judicial notice) also does not include
the model ordinance. (See
<http://www.fresno.gov/NR/rdonlyres/CA0CB396-39EB-44C2-8113 93B0AC6A28BA/0/2025GPAppendices.pdf>
[as of Apr. 13, 2007].) We rely on the description of the ordinance in the
trial court's order and on the trial court's assertion that the ordinance was
made part of the appendix. Even without policy C-8-b, we would not
be inclined to treat the model ordinance as binding law. Including something
called a model ordinance as an attachment to an appendix to a general plan is
very different from enacting an actual ordinance. With policy C-8-b, it
is apparent that the city did not intend to be bound by any specific ratio of
housing to nonhousing uses in mixed-use projects. This
leaves only the general goals and principles for mixed uses set forth in the
general plan, such as to "[f]acilitate the development of mixed uses to
blend residential, commercial and public land uses on one site," and
"[r]edesignate vacant land for higher density uses or mixed use ...
." (2025 Fresno General Plan, supra, p. 38 & appen. A, p. 178.)
We cannot say the city abused its discretion in finding that approval of the
project was consistent with these general expressions of policy. Woodward
Park's further argument
that the city should have enacted the model ordinance merits little
discussion. The argument is that, because the general plan required the city to
begin devising implementation measures within 90 days of the plan's adoption,
and the city did not adopt a mixed-use zoning ordinance until much later (after
this case was tried), we should retroactively impose an obligation to adhere to
the terms of a hypothetical ordinance requiring 20 to 50 percent housing. Even
assuming a remedy like this is legally possible under some conceivable
circumstances, nothing here authorizes us to impose the terms of the model
ordinance and then reverse the city's action on the ground that it violates the
terms we have imposed. DISPOSITION
The
judgment is reversed. The trial court shall issue a writ of mandate ordering
the city to reverse its actions certifying the EIR, approving the rezoning, and
approving the plan amendments. Appellants shall recover their costs on appeal. Cornell,
J.,* and Dawson, J., concurred. * Justice Cornell did not participate in the
court's order filed on May 11, 2007, modifying the opinion, denying rehearing,
granting a request for judicial notice and denying leave to produce additional
evidence. The modification of the
opinion did not alter the judgment. 
This file last modified on: Monday, November 17, 2003.Document URL: http://ceres.ca.gov/html_lib/footers/foot98.html Copyright © 1998-2003 California Resources Agency. All rights reserved. |